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ABSTRACT
Prevention and resolution of conflicts on the basis of agreed-
upon rules and just procedures are common objectives for national
and international law at both the public and private level (Section
1). The diversity of national and international dispute settlement
fora and procedures gives incentives for forum and rule shopping
not only in private commercial law (Section 2) but also increasingly
in public international economic law (Section 3). Effective litiga-
tion strategies examine the respective advantages and disadvan-
tages of Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR") methods and fora
(Section 4). ADR options are increasingly important in various
categories of dispute settlement proceedings at the World Trade
Organization ("WTO") (Section 5). Optimal dispute prevention
and settlement strategies require distinguishing the different cate-
gories of international trade disputes according to their underlying
conflicts of interests, promoting legal consistency between interna-
tional and domestic dispute settlement proceedings, and decentral-
izing certain kinds of international economic disputes over private
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rights (Section 6). Jurisdictional competition, forum and rule
shopping, and the increasing number of mutually conflicting
judgments by national and international courts call for interna-
tional cooperation among judges so as to promote greater respect
for international law throughout transnational judicial networks
(Section 7).
1. JUSTICE AS CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THREE CONCEPTIONS OF
JUSTICE
In a world of individual and social diversity, with unlimited
demand for limited resources and knowledge, the rational egoism
and limited altruism of individuals makes conflicts of interest in-
evitable.1 Every human being is confronted, throughout one's life,
with a need to prevent or settle internal conflicts (e.g., between
passion and rationality in one's mind) and external conflicts (e.g.,
among self-interested individuals in families, cities, and other so-
cial units).2 Just as individual rationality requires impartially ex-
amining, reviewing, and judging contested facts and contrary ar-
guments in one's own mind, social rationality requires fair
procedures and rules for the peaceful prevention or settlement of
disputes in a manner respecting the basic rights of parties to a dis-
pute (e.g., audi alteram partem). National and international legal
systems make rational attempts at elaborating such principles and
procedures. The evolution of rules and procedures for dispute
prevention and settlement reflects diverse human values and ex-
periences. That evolution will remain contested as long as such
rules and procedures are not perceived as just. Three different, but
complementary, conceptions of justice are likely to influence the
search for more effective dispute prevention and settlement.
1.1. Justice as Fair Procedures
Since Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Politics, the dependence of
conflict resolution on adversary reasoning and self-imposed prin-
ciples and rules -such as moral fairness principles for peace within
individuals and constitutional rules for peace in democratic repub-
1 See generally JOHN B. DAVIS, THE THEORY OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN ECONOMICS:
IDENTITY AND VALUE (2003) (examining the concept of the "individual" in social
sciences and the tension that arises from the clash between the world within an
individual and the world outside).
2 Id.
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lics -has remained the central theme of legal philosophy.
3 Plato
and Aristotle defined social justice as harmony under the govern-
ance of reason, holding perceived psychological and social conflicts
as evils.4 Modern legal, political, and economic theories, by con-
trast, acknowledge the inevitability and normality of conflicts and
the impossibility of substantive harmony in extended, antagonistic
societies.5 Under these theories, respect for individual freedom en-
tails an understanding that internal and social conflicts are not nec-
essarily signs of vice but may merely reflect legitimate struggles for
law.6 When a friend wished U.S. Supreme Court justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes well in doing justice, he responded, "That is not
my job .... It is my job to apply the law[, ... to see that the game
is played according to the rules whether I like them or not."
7 Yet
the widespread criticism leveled by society regarding the lack of
"input-legitimacy" (in terms of respect for human rights and de-
mocratic procedures) and "output-legitimacy" (in terms of con-
sumer welfare, fulfillment of human rights, and protection of the
environment) of WTO rules and jurisprudence (e.g., on trade-
related health and environmental issues like genetically modified
organisms and the protection of dolphins and sea turtles) illus-
trates that power-oriented rules of international law and state-
centered dispute settlement procedures are often perceived as se-
curing neither procedural nor substantive justice. In the modern
age of universal human rights and the moral imperative of maxi-
mizing freedom under the rule of law, judges may challenge the
procedural justice of power-oriented rules and may focus not only
on the rights and interests of the parties to a dispute but also on the
3 See CARL J. FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 8-
12, 191-99 (2d ed. 1963) (examining ancient philosophers' conceptualizations of
participation in justice, equality, and the common man).
4 Id. at 191-99.
5 Compare, e.g., STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT 79-98 (2000) (examin-
ing the philosophical notion that justice in conflict resolutions is best provided by
fair procedures) with Louis M. BROWN, MANUAL OF PREVENTIVE LAW 3-10 (1950)
(examining the "preventive law" concept that certain measures are necessary to
create substantive fairness and avoid leaving victims of litigation financially and
emotionally weakened).
6 See RUDOLF VON JEHRING, DER ZWECK IM RECHT (1877) (arguing that the law
finds its purpose progressively through an unending struggle for individual
rights). This conception of the law can be traced to ancient times. For instance,
Sophocles' Antigone challenged the king's ruling that she be prevented from
burying her brother by invoking a "natural" law higher than the king's law.
7 THOMAS SOWELL, THE QUEST FOR COSMIC JUSTICE 169 (1999).
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consistency of their judgments with the progressive extension of
universal rules of justice.8
Mutually beneficial private and public trade laws belong to the
oldest fields of international law and, since ancient times, have in-
fluenced the development of many other areas of international law.
As all international legal relations raise economic questions, it is
not surprising that the dispute settlement procedures in interna-
tional trade law-in, for example, the European Community
("EC") and at the WTO-are among the most developed in inter-
national law and have also influenced non-economic dispute set-
tlement practices at, among other places, the European Court of
Justice ("ECJ"). For centuries, international trade law has evolved
from local, national, and bilateral towards multilateral trade regu-
lation and dispute settlement systems. This serves to better protect
the rational long-term interests of individuals and states (in areas
such as the rule of law, open markets, and consumer welfare)
against their oftentimes conflicting short-term interests (such as in-
terests in efficient breaches of contractual obligations). The legal
and institutional changes also influence the culture and outcome of
negotiations and politics by, for example, promoting principled
bargaining and deliberative politics over positional bargaining,9
rule-oriented over power-oriented dispute settlement procedures, 10
and judicial protection of general citizen interests over bureaucratic
and rent-seeking group interests.
8 See ALLEN D. ROSEN, KANT'S THEORY OF JUSTICE 47-65 (1993) (examining uni-
versal law in light of Kant's "moral imperative"). See generally Ernst-Ulrich Pe-
tersmann, How to Constitutionalize International Law and Foreign Policy for the Benefit
of Civil Society?, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 7-20 (1998) (examining how Kantian theo-
ries of antagonistic human behavior and universal rules of justice lead to increas-
ingly precise national and international constitutional protections).
9 See JORG STEINER ET AL., DELIBERATIVE POLITICS IN ACTION: ANALYSING
PARLIAMENTARY DISCOURSE 16-32 (2004) (exploring both the advantages of princi-
pled over positional bargaining, as well as negotiation and political theories ex-
plaining why institutional rules can improve the quality and output of political
negotiations and discourse). See generally ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO
YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 1-14 (Bruce Patton ed., Penguin
Books 2d ed. 1991) (explaining the risks associated with positional bargaining).
10 Cf. ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
SYSTEM: INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT 66-70 (1997).
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1.2. Justice as Respect for Basic Rights
Prior to the constitutional recognition of human rights, theories
of justice tended to focus on procedural justice," such as fair proce-
dures and requirements of reasonableness and good faith, notwith-
standing the manifold power-oriented limitations of legal rules
since antiquity-for example, the discrimination against women,
slaves, and citizens without property. Public international law, like
national legal systems, evolved from power-oriented rules regarding
state sovereignty, which attached more importance to power and
order (i.e., effective government control of a population in a given
territory) than justice and democratic legitimacy.' 2 To the extent
that conflicts more reflect a struggle for power than a search for just
rules, peaceful conflict prevention may fail. Today, the universal
recognition of inalienable human rights requires that justice be de-
fined more comprehensively in terms of procedural and substantive
human rights, as well as the other constitutional rights held by indi-
viduals.
1 3
The human right of "access to justice" is almost universally rec-
ognized today, reflecting the worldwide recognition that fairness
and justice in dispute settlement procedures is necessary both at
home and abroad.' 4 In European integration law, individual legal
11 Cf. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
327-50 (1995) (focusing on procedural justice in the field of international law, em-
phasizing the traditional weight placed on power and order over justice).
12 Cf Rosemary Foot, Introduction to ORDER AND JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 1-17 (Rosemary Foot et al. eds., 2003) (discussing order and justice
within the context of international relations, examining what impact the emphasis
on order has had on international law); JANNA THOMSON, JUSTICE AND WORLD
ORDER: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 188-96 (1992) (exploring the importance of or-
der from a philosophical standpoint, taking into account both cosmopolitan and
communitarian points of view).
13 See ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION:
MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-2 (Will Kymlicka et al. eds., 2004)
(arguing that international and domestic legal systems should conform to moral
principles, including principles of justice); see also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Theo-
ries of Justice, Human Rights, and the Constitution of International Markets, 37 LOYOLA
L.A. L. REV. 407, 408-15 (2003) (describing how international constitutional law
developed when inalienable human rights were recognized).
14 See Angela Ward, Access to Justice, in THE EUROPEAN UNION CHARTER OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (Steve Peers & Angela Ward eds., 2004) 123, 123-26 (exam-
ining how the European Union ("EU") charter treats access to justice as a funda-
mental right, emphasizing the importance of such access as a human right); see
also Carol Harlow, Access to Justice as a Human Right: The European Convention and
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and judicial remedies, based on both European Union ("EU") law
and the European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR"), have
been progressively extended to protect not only civil and political
rights but also economic and social rights, as well as market free-
dom, from undue national and intergovernmental restrictions. The
WTO Agreement provides few comprehensive legal and judicial
guarantees that individual traders, producers, and other economic
operators will be able to have access domestic courts or arbitration
(e.g., pursuant to Article 4 of the WTO Agreement on Preshipment
Inspection). 5 Like the domestic implementation of WTO rules, the
legal and judicial guarantees of access to courts (vis-d-vis trade re-
strictions) continue to differ from country to country, varying ac-
cording to each's constitutional and legal traditions.16 In the EC and
the United States, domestic courts hardly ever apply and enforce the
international WTO obligations of the country concerned; in line
with the mercantilist traditions of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade ("GATT") and WTO negotiations, only export industries
are granted legal and judicial remedies against violations of WTO
rules by foreign governments (e.g., under Section 301 of the U.S.
Trade Act and the EC's Trade Barriers Regulation).17 The variety
of national and international rules and procedures for the settlement
of international economic disputes has led to an increased prolifera-
tion and fragmentation of dispute settlement fora and jurisprudence
in international trade law. In international trade and investment dis-
putes, forum and rule shopping continues to be popular practice, not
only by governments but also by individual producers, investors,
traders, and other economic operators hoping for their own justice.
This remains a fundamental challenge in international economic
law.
the European Union, in THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS 187, 191-96 (Phillip Alston et al.
eds., 1999) (examining how access to courts within the European Community
("EC") is considered a human right).
15 Cf. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, supra note 10, at 194-96.
16 Compare the country studies in IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY ROUND
AGREEMENTS, (John H. Jackson & Alan 0. Sykes, eds., 1997) with Emst-Ulrich Pe-
tersmann, On Reinforcing WTO Rules in Domestic Laws, in RETHINKING THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM (John J. Barcelo III & Hugh Corbet eds., 2006, forthcoming).
17 Cf. CANDIDO TOMAS GARCIA MOLYNEUX, DOMESTIC STRUCTURES AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE UNFAIR TRADE INSTRUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND
THE EUROPEAN UNION (2001).
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1.3. Justice as Constitutional Order
Respect for procedural justice and basic rights may not be pos-
sible outside a constitutional order that limits abuses of power and
protects basic equal rights both at home and abroad.18 In Europe,
the ECJ interprets the EC Treaty as a "constitutional charter," 19 just
as the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") interprets the
ECHR as the constitutional charter of Europe, 20 providing for the
protection of human rights across Europe as an objective "constitu-
tional order. 21  The ECJ, the Court of the European Free Trade
Area ("EFTA"), and national courts also recognize and protect hu-
man rights and private market freedoms against national and inter-
governmental restrictions in the economic sphere. 22
The human rights obligations of United Nations ("UN") Mem-
ber States to respect, protect, and promote human rights challenge
the power-oriented premises of state-centered rules. They require a
review of the traditional approaches to international dispute preven-
tion (by state-centered rulemaking and rule implementation) and
settlement (by negotiations and third-party adjudication among
governments), using those obligations as balancing principles for
reconciling state-centered international law rules with individual
human rights. 23 An increasing number of European and U.S. law-
yers draw attention to the constitutional dimensions of WTO laws
and jurisprudence for limiting and legitimizing multilevel trade
governance. 24 Yet the intergovernmental dispute settlement proce-
18 See Petersmann, supra note 13, at 422 (discussing constitutional rights to
democratic governance and constitutional order as a "third principle of justice").
19 See PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Armin von Bogdandy &
Jargen Bast eds., 2006) (discussing the constitutional jurisprudence of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice ("ECJ")).
20 See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 65 (1978) (showing a rul-
ing based on the European Convention of Human Rights ("ECHR")).
21 See Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A.) at 7, para. 75 (1995) (Pre-
liminary Objections) (arguing that optional clauses for obligations weaken the
convention as the constitutional order for the EC).
22 See, e.g., Ward, supra note 14, at 124-25 (referencing the relevant jurispru-
dence in chapters on access to justice and internal market remedies).
23 Cf. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights and International Trade Law: De-
fining and Connecting the Two Fields, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
29-94 (Thomas Cottier et al. eds., 2005).
24 Cf. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Introduction to CONSTITUTIONALISM,
MULTILEVEL TRADE GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL REGULATION (Christian Joerges &
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dures at the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") and the WTO
continue to focus on the equal rights of states rather than the rights
of individuals. The differences in the applicable rules and dispute
settlement procedures at national, regional, and worldwide levels
and the often overlapping jurisdiction of alternative dispute settle-
ment fora (e.g., for disputes over intellectual property rights) favor
forum and rule shopping as well as mutually inconsistent judgments
(where national courts disregard intergovernmental rules), giving
rise to complex problems for national and international courts (see
Sections 2 and 3 below).
1.4. Fragmentation and Unity of International Law
The fragmentation of international dispute settlement proce-
dures is closely related to the fragmentation of international
agreements in particular subject-areas (such as trade, environ-
mental, criminal, and human rights law) and their respective rules
about amendments, responsibility, and dispute settlement. In its
study Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of In-
ternational Law, the International Law Commission distinguishes
three types of normative conflicts and fragmentation: (1) fragmen-
tation through conflicting interpretations of general international
law rules by different international courts; (2) fragmentation and
conflicts arising when a particular rule claims to exist as an excep-
tion (lex specialis) to general law; and (3) fragmentation and con-
flicts between different special international treaty regimes.25 The
ever-expanding scope of international economic law gives rise to
numerous potential conflicts with other special and general rules
of international law, such as conflicts between international trade
and environmental agreements.
26
No international treaty can be applied without recourse to gen-
eral international law rules (e.g., pacta sunt servanda), just as no le-
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2006).
25 See Int'l Law Comm'n, Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of Interna-
tional Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International
Law, 10, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.644 (July 18, 2003) (discussing changes in interna-
tional law).
26 See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The WTO Dispute over Genetically Modi-
fied Organisms: Interface Problems of International Trade Law, Environmental Law and
Biotechnology Law, in BIOTECHNOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Francesco Fran-
cioni ed., 2006) (addressing potential conflicts between WTO rules and the 2000
Cartagena Protocol to the 1992 UN Convention on Biodiversity).
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gal system can develop coherently without recourse to general
principles of law.27 International courts increasingly acknowledge
the need for interpreting international treaties with due regard to
the general international law obligations of the contracting parties
and the general principles of law underlying special treaty re-
gimes. The WTO Appellate Body, for instance, has consistently
emphasized since its first report that WTO law "is not to be read in
clinical isolation from public international law."28 WTO jurispru-
dence increasingly refers to the "basic principles underlying this
multilateral trading system,"29 as well as general principles of na-
tional and international law, for interpreting and balancing the
specific treaty rights and obligations of WTO members. Notwith-
standing the fragmentation of specialized international treaty re-
gimes and related dispute settlement procedures, the customary
rules of international treaty interpretation may require courts to act
as guardians of unity in international law.
2. FORUM AND RULE SHOPPING IN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC TRADE
LAW: COMMON PROBLEMS
For centuries, the demand for predictability and legal certainty
in private commerce (ubi commercium, ibi ius) has been a driving
force for the emergence of commercial customs (lex mercatoria) and
institutions (e.g., arbitration) for the prevention and settlement of
commercial disputes. Even though individual dispute settlement
procedures and institutions vary immensely in different fora and
legal contexts (e.g., in Anglo-Saxon countries versus civil law coun-
tries based on Roman law), sometimes continuing to reflect strug-
gles for power (e.g., in cases of judicial self-restraint vis-a-vis so-
called political questions), some of the diverse legal and judicial
traditions have slowly merged in transnational arbitration and
other dispute settlement practices. The steady expansion of the
global division of labor entails ever more international disputes
over transnational private economic activities (e.g., commercial
27 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 1-13 (1977) (addressing the
fact that every legal system consists not only of rules but also general principles).
28 Appellate Body Report, United States- Standards for Reformulated and Con-
ventional Gasoline, art. 31, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 20, 1996).
29 Preamble of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, in
The Legal Texts -Results of the Uruguay Round (1994) (edited by the GATT Se-
cretariat); see also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
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contracts and non-contractual products liability) and government
regulation of economic transactions. The more that countries in-
volve themselves in international production and trade, the more
concurrent jurisdictions may exist for settling disputes concerning
international economic transactions. Due to the diversity of na-
tional laws, procedures, and judicial systems, the outcome of pri-
vate transnational litigation and the applicable procedures-
substantive law, speed, and legal costs-are often influenced by
the choice of venue in which the litigation will take place.
The complainant may choose a jurisdiction in order to benefit
from the procedural advantages of the chosen forum (e.g., low fil-
ing fees, possibility of class actions, pretrial discovery, jury trials,
large damage awards, and the non-recovery of costs rule in U.S.
courts). The particular procedures involved may also influence the
application of substantive domestic or foreign law and the out-
come of disputes. The jurisdiction chosen by a complainant may
be contested by the defendant, who can request a stay of the pro-
ceedings, apply for anti-suit injunctions, or submit counterclaims
to a different jurisdiction. The burgeoning of international law
firms and multinational companies with offices and legal expertise
in many countries facilitate transnational litigation strategies. In
case of concurrent jurisdictions, court battles over the most conven-
ient jurisdiction, against exorbitant jurisdiction, and overabusive
forum and rule shopping have become ever more frequent in pri-
vate international litigation because they often influence the out-
come of disputes.30 Courts increasingly respect forum selection
agreements if they reflect the free will of the parties and are neither
unfair, unreasonable, nor inconsistent with the public policy in the
jurisdiction of the competent court in question. Governments have
facilitated the creation of forum selection agreements by means of
international agreements on the allocation of jurisdiction, the mu-
tual recognition and enforcement of foreign civil judgments and
arbitral awards, and the codification of legal criteria for the limita-
tion of abusive forum shopping by determining the "natural" or
"most appropriate" forum with which the dispute has the closest
30 See generally ANDREW BELL, FORUM SHOPPING AND VENUE IN TRANSNATIONAL
LITIGATION (2003) (describing the incentives for and conceptual responses to fo-
rum shopping); WILLIAM W. PARK, INTERNATIONAL FORUM SELECTION (1995) (ex-
ploring forum selection agreements and why forum selection matters to such a
great extent).
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and most real connection.
31
In public international trade law, problems of forum and rule
shopping emerged as a result of the 1979 Tokyo Round Agree-
ments, which offered special dispute settlement procedures and
substantive rules different from those found in the GATT of 1947.32
These problems were largely addressed by legally integrating and
coordinating - in the substantive dispute settlement rules of the
WTO - the various multilateral trade agreements annexed to the
1994 WTO Agreement and covered by its Dispute Settlement Un-
derstanding ("DSU"), 33 notwithstanding the recognition of "special
or additional rules and procedures contained in the covered
agreements" listed in Appendix 2 of the DSU.
34
Outside WTO law, most international judicial bodies operate in
"splendid isolation," without explicit regulation of the jurisdic-
tional interaction between international courts and with little, if
any, regard for the jurisprudence of other international tribunals.
While WTO dispute settlement bodies cite judgments of the ICJ
frequently, the ECJ refers only rarely to decisions of other interna-
tional courts (such as the ECtHR, EFTA and WTO dispute settle-
ment rulings); the ICJ has hardly ever cited decisions of interna-
tional tribunals other than its predecessor, the Permanent Court of
International Justice ("PCIJ"). Forum shopping and multiple litiga-
tions have become frequent in the legally and institutionally frag-
mented international law of human rights, but they remain rare in
most other areas of public international law.35  Jurisdictional
clashes among international courts and judicial challenges to WTO
jurisdiction (similar to challenges to the EC Court's jurisdiction by
national constitutional courts in some EC Member States) have
been avoided so far.
36
31 Cf. YUVAL SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS
AND TRIBUNALS 130-31 (2003) (discussing the reasons for forum shopping).
32 See Petersmann, supra note, 10 at 271-84 (listing the twenty-four settlement
proceedings under the Tokyo Round Agreements on subsidies, anti-dumping,
and government procurement).
33 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organi-
zation, Annex 2, Legal Instruments -Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M.
1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
34 See id. at 1227-30 (providing further details).
35 See, e.g., Lawrence R. Helfer, Forum Shopping for Human Rights, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 285 (1999) (discussing the fragmentation of human rights law with regard to
forum shopping).
36 One of the rare instances of conflicting judicial interpretations of general
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The citizen-oriented approaches of European courts, the state-
centered approach of the ICJ, and the openness of the WTO dispute
settlement system to nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs")
(e.g., regarding submission of amicus curiae briefs), non-state actors
(e.g., Hong Kong and Taiwan), and intergovernmental organiza-
tions (e.g., the EC) reflect the diverse regulatory approaches taken
by governments. Judicial governance by the EC Court, EFTA, and
the ECtHR on the basis of agreed-upon international rules has be-
come accepted inside Europe but continues to be opposed in state-
centered and power-oriented worldwide organizations, where the
scope of compulsory jurisdiction (e.g., by the ICJ) remains much
more restricted. For instance, while U.S. administrative agencies
have implemented more than twenty adverse WTO dispute set-
tlement findings against trade restrictions imposed by the United
States, Congress has-in the eight WTO disputes where U.S. fed-
eral law was found to be inconsistent with WTO obligations- been
reluctant to bring the relevant statutes in conformity with U.S. ob-
ligations under WTO law.37 Capital-exporting countries like the
United States have tended to favor investor-state arbitration as
long as such arbitration is directed against capital-importing coun-
tries; some investor-state arbitral awards challenging U.S. legal
practices, such as the International Center for the Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes ("ICSID") arbitration award in the case Loewen
Group, Inc. v. United States, have, however, provoked hostile criti-
cism (e.g., by the media and non-governmental organizations in
the United States) that an international arbitral tribunal had dared
to criticize the "unfairness" of U.S. court procedures, 38 even though
international law rules arose in the 1999 Tadic judgment made by the Appeals
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia, which
construed the "effective control" test for the establishment of state responsibility
for acts its military forces conunit differently than the International Court of Jus-
tice ("ICJ") did in its Nicaragua judgment. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-
1-A, Judgment, paras. 115-45 (July 15, 1999) (explaining why the "effective con-
trol" test articulation from Nicaragua is not persuasive).
37 See Update of WTO Dispute Settlement Cases, Note by the Secretariat,
WT/DS/OV/23 (Apr. 7, 2005) (referencing relevant WTO documents discussed
below). The eight WTO dispute settlement rulings requiring action by Congress
relate to legislation on Foreign Sales Corporations, the 1916 U.S. Antidumping
Act, the Byrd Amendment, Section 211 of the U.S. Appropriations Act (relating to
the trademark "Havana Club"), Section 111 of the Copyright Act (relating to Irish
music copyrights), recent amendments to the Anti-Dumping Act (relating to hot-
rolled steel from Japan), U.S. cotton subsidies, and internet gambling.
38 Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Arbitral Award, International Centre
for the Settlement of Disputes [ICSID] ARB(AF)/98/3 (June 26, 2003) (concerning
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the international arbitral tribunal in this case found that it lacked
jurisdiction under the applicable rules of the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") and refused to correct the observed
"miscarriage of justice" by the U.S. court in question.39
The diverse national and international dispute settlement pro-
cedures in private and public international trade law reveal many
common features and problems:
1. increasing recourse to treaty-based international arbitra-
tion (e.g., at the WTO, the ICSID, and the International
Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") and under the Law of
the Sea Convention, the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty,
and NAFTA);
2. frequent composition of arbitral tribunals by not only
lawyers but also non-legal experts in trade, banking, in-
surance, telecommunications, and sports arbitration;
3. NGO challenges to arbitration confidentiality (e.g., un-
der NAFTA, ICSID, and the dispute settlement proceed-
ings at the WTO), including requests to allow the ad-
mission of amicus curiae briefs, private access to
documents, ad hoc agreements to permit public access
to WTO panel proceedings, and recognition of the right
to use private legal counsel, increasingly involved in the
drafting of legal submissions by governmental com-
plainants and defendants;
4. growing influence of public international law (including
general principles regarding treaty interpretation, good
faith, estoppel, abuse of rights, and human rights) on
the applicable law in commercial arbitration, mixed in-
vestor-state arbitration (e.g., in the more than 100 arbi-
tration proceedings under ICSID rules), and trade dis-
putes (e.g., references to human rights in ECJ
jurisprudence on trade restrictions and to multilateral
a Missisippi jury award of $500 million damages against a foreign investor).
39 Id. para. 241-42. See Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The
New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 383-
87 (2003) (discussing the hostile response to an increasing number of anti-U.S.
North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") arbitrations).
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environmental agreements in WTO dispute settlement
reports);
5. expanding scope of the "arbitrability" of private dis-
putes (e.g., over antitrust rules and intellectual property
rights) and intergovernmental economic disputes
which, even if formally conducted among states (e.g., at
the WTO), are often initiated by private complainants
(e.g., the WTO disputes such as the Kodak-Fuji case be-
tween the United States and Japan over alleged anti-
competitive practices in Japan and the Havana Club case
between the European Union and the United States
over the trademark claims of two competing liquor
companies in Europe and the United States) and carried
out like "private-public partnerships" (e.g., in the con-
duct of WTO dispute settlement proceedings);40
6. judicial methods of interpreting public policy clauses
(e.g., GATT Article XX and Article 30 of the EC Treaty)
by recourse to the constitutional principles and public
policies maintained by the countries involved (e.g., re-
quirements of necessity and proportionality for gov-
ernment restrictions);
7. increasing recognition by national and international
courts (most notably in Europe) of the advantages asso-
ciated with international collaboration among judges to
promote legal consistency of judgments by different
courts;
8. recourse to ADR, such as use of special fact-finding
procedures (e.g., pursuant to Annex V of the WTO
Agreement on Subsidies) and mediation at the WTO,
arbitrators-as-facilitators, and other methods of com-
mercial arbitration (e.g., the already more than 3,000
domain name disputes under the arbitration and me-
diation rules of the World Intellectual Property Organi-
40 See generally GREGORY C. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-PRWATE
PARTNERSHIPS IN WTO LITIGATION (2003) (discussing the blurring of the public and
private in international trade law).
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zation ("WIPO"));
9. successive or parallel dispute settlement proceedings in
national, regional, or worldwide fora (e.g., on anti-
dumping duties, countervailing duties, safeguard
measures, or EC import restrictions on bananas and ge-
netically modified goods), with some mutually incoher-
ent rulings if national courts and regional courts disre-
gard the relevant WTO obligations of the countries
concerned only to be challenged later in WTO dispute
settlement proceedings;
10. concurrent and partly overlapping jurisdiction of na-
tional and international courts, which requires potential
complainants to carefully examine their litigation op-
tions and strategies-for example, the more limited le-
gal remedies available at WTO dispute settlement pro-
ceedings over intellectual property rights compared
with those available in intellectual property disputes at
the ICJ, the ICSID, WIPO arbitration, domestic courts,
or under NAFTA.
3. TEN REASONS FOR INCREASINGLY OVERLAPPING JURISDICTIONS
AND FORUM SHOPPING IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
For a number of reasons, trends in favor of overlapping juris-
dictions, forum shopping, concurrent or successive trade disputes,
and related court proceedings in different fora over the same legal
claims are likely to expand in public international trade law:
1. Many intergovernmental WTO disputes overlap with
prior, parallel, or future related disputes at national and
regional levels (e.g., at the ECJ and under NAFTA). For
example, parallel to the WTO dispute settlement pro-
ceedings against EC import restrictions on bananas and
biotech products, related disputes were pending before
the ECJ and national courts in the EC. Imports of Ca-
nadian lumber into the United States have been subject
to numerous dispute settlement panel proceedings un-
der NAFTA and at the WTO over the past few years.
The more than 340 formal complaints submitted to the
2872006]
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WTO between 1995 and 2006 have led to more than 110
panel reports, more than seventy Appellate Body re-
ports, and more than forty arbitration award and com-
pliance panel reports.41 Compared with only 200 dis-
pute settlement proceedings under GATT between 1948
and 1994,42 only three NAFTA panel proceedings pur-
suant to Chapter 20 over the past ten years, and less
than 100 adversarial proceedings before the ICJ since
1946, the rapidly increasing number of WTO panel, ap-
pellate and arbitration proceedings reflects increasingly
universal WTO membership, the ever-broader scope of
WTO law, and the judicialization of dispute settlement
in almost all areas of the WTO, even in highly fact-
oriented areas (like the 2003 panel report on U.S. safe-
guard measures on steel products spanning more than
900 pages) and in new fields of WTO law like services
trade and intellectual property rights.
2. With the phasing out of the various transitional WTO
provisions for less developed countries and certain
kinds of disputes (e.g., disputes about agricultural sub-
sidies covered by the "Peace Clause" in Article 13 of the
WTO Agreement on Agriculture), the number of WTO
disputes is likely to increase rapidly. In terms of bind-
ing treaty obligations, precision of rules, compulsory ju-
risdiction of national and international (quasi-)judicial
dispute settlement proceedings, and the number of
WTO panel, appellate and arbitration reports, WTO law
is progressively evolving into the most legalized area of
worldwide international law.
3. WTO agreements overlap with other international
agreements, such as the Paris Convention on Industrial
Property and the Bern Convention for the Protection of
41 See WTO Secretariat, Update of WTO Dispute Settlement Cases,
WT/DS/OV/23 (Apr. 7, 2005) (providing legal analyses for these rules). See also
THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 1995-2003 558-73 (Francesco Ortino &
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2004).
42 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 771-787
(1995).
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Literary and Artistic Work, each of which provides for
different dispute settlement fora (e.g., the ICJ). For in-
stance, in the EC-U.S. dispute over the EC's airport
noise regulations limiting the use of "hushkits" by air-
planes (mainly from the United States), the United
States chose to submit the dispute to the dispute settle-
ment procedures of the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization rather than to the dispute settlement proce-
dures of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade or, since the EC noise regulations restricted air
transport services, the General Agreement on Trade in
Services ("GATS"). 43 The increasing number of multi-
lateral environmental agreements ("MEAs") with trade
provisions and special dispute settlement procedures
44
also offers examples of overlapping or competing juris-
dictions for the settlement of trade-related disputes both
inside and outside the WTO, such as at the ICJ or via
special dispute settlement procedures provided for in
the MEAs themselves. Thus, disputes over "emission
trading" under the Vienna Convention and the Mont-
real Protocol for the protection of the ozone layer, over
pharmaceutical companies sharing traditional knowl-
edge held by indigenous people about species protected
by the UN Convention on Biodiversity, or over trade in
biotech food regulated by the Cartagena Protocol to the
UN Convention on Biodiversity may influence the in-
terpretation of related WTO rules and dispute settle-
ment rulings, just as WTO jurisprudence -like on the
Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Rights ("TRIPS")- may influence the dispute settlement
practice in other jurisdictions (e.g., WIPO arbitration
procedures).
4. Since the 1990s, an increasing number of new world-
43 See Kenneth W. Abbott, US-EU Disputes over Technical Barriers to Trade and
the "Hushkits" Dispute, in TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC DISPUTES-THE EU, THE US
AND THE WTO 247, 247-280 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Mark Pollack eds., 2003)
[hereinafter TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC DISPUTES].
44 See CESARE ROMANO, THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES (2000).
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wide courts have been established, each possessing ju-
risdiction that overlap or interact with the jurisdiction
of WTO dispute settlement proceedings. For example,
when Chile restricted access to its ports by European
fishing vessels on the ground that they were overfishing
swordfish in the Pacific in violation of the EC's obliga-
tions under the Law of the Sea Convention ("LOS"), the
EC requested the establishment of a WTO dispute set-
tlement panel to examine the alleged violations of trade
rules (e.g., GATT Article V on freedom of transit). Chile
submitted the dispute to the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea ("ITLOS") instead. As the LOS Con-
vention includes explicit references to GATT rules (e.g.,
on subsidies) and LOS Convention rules may be rele-
vant for the interpretation of various WTO exceptions,
parallel or mutually relevant dispute settlement pro-
ceedings at the WTO and ITLOS may also occur in fu-
ture disputes.
5. Just as WTO rules are occasionally invoked and applied
at the ECJ and in dispute settlement panels set up under
NAFTA, an increasing number of regional economic
courts - such as EFTA, the Andean, Caribbean, and
Central American courts of justice, the Southern Com-
mon Market ("MERCOSUR") Permanent Court of Re-
view, the Economic Court of the Commonwealth of In-
dependent States ("CIS"), and the various regional
economic courts in Africa, including the Common Mar-
ket of Eastern and Southern Africa and the Economic
Community of West Africa-are likely to interpret and
apply, either directly or indirectly, WTO or regional
economic rules based on corresponding WTO provi-
sions (e.g., GATT's free trade area and customs union
rules). As the legal and judicial remedies of domestic
and regional courts tend to go beyond those of WTO
dispute settlement bodies (e.g., regarding reparation for
the discriminatory taking of property rights), private
economic operators adversely affected by violations of
WTO rules may prefer recourse to domestic and re-
gional courts rather than to WTO dispute settlement
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proceedings.
6. Many intergovernmental WTO disputes are triggered
by complaints from private producers, investors, trad-
ers, consumer associations, or other nongovernmental
groups. Such complainants may prefer to submit their
legal claims-for example, over intellectual property
rights protected under TRIPS or over investor rights
protected by market access, national treatment, or addi-
tional commitments under GATS-to mixed interna-
tional arbitration, which grants direct access to private
complainants and enables them to handle and control
their claims without political interference by their home
governments. For example, a pharmaceutical company
claiming violations of its patent rights resulting from
parallel imports into a foreign WTO member state or
from compulsory licenses granted by a foreign WTO
government may prefer to submit its dispute to the me-
diation and mixed arbitration procedures of WIP0 45 or,
in the case of production and foreign investments
abroad, to mixed arbitration at the ICSID (whose juris-
diction also includes disputes over intellectual property
rights) 46 or under NAFTA Chapter 11.
47
7. Some WTO agreements explicitly provide for private
access to domestic courts so as to examine whether, for
instance, national government procurement practices
have violated that government's obligations under the
WTO Agreement on Government Procurement.48 Arti-
45 See WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Expedited Arbitration Rules, in
WIPO ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION RULES 57 (1999) (describing the WIPO media-
tion and arbitration rules allowing "mixed" arbitration between private and state
parties).
46 See generally CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A
COMMENTARY (2001).
47 On the different intergovernmental dispute settlement procedures (Chap-
ter 20), mixed arbitration procedures (Chapter 11) and private access to binational
panel procedures for the review of final anti-dumping and countervailing duty
determinations (Chapter 19) in the NAFTA Agreement, see Course on Dispute
Settlement, Regional Approaches, Module 6.1: NAFTA, UNCTAD/EDM/
Misc.232/Add.24 (2003) (prepared by L. Ojeda & C. Azar).
48 On the different intergovernmental and private-state dispute settlement
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cle XX of the WTO Agreement on Government Pro-
curement is noteworthy in granting private parties di-
rect access to national challenge procedures before do-
mestic courts or other independent review bodies, each
of which must provide for prompt correction of a
breach of the relevant WTO agreement or compensation
for the loss or damages suffered. The WTO Agreement
on Pre-Shipment Inspection even provides for private
access to private or mixed international arbitration in-
side the WTO in order to examine any violations of
relevant legal obligations within very short time
frames.
49
8. The universal recognition of human rights and the pro-
liferation of legal and judicial remedies against human
rights violations provided for in regional and UN hu-
man rights treaties mean that international disputes
over human rights may have repercussions for the in-
terpretation and application of WTO rules, and vice
versa. For example, just as the ECJ examined trade re-
strictions and other economic regulations (e.g., on bio-
tech food) in the light of human rights, including a
"fundamental right to human dignity and integrity,"
50
WTO dispute settlement bodies may also be confronted
with references to human rights (as well as correspond-
ing government obligations to protect and promote
human rights) as relevant legal contexts for the judicial
procedures under the 1996 WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, see
Course on Dispute Settlement, World Trade Organization, Module 3.12: Government
Procurement, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.27, 3-15 (2003) (prepared by Perez
Gabilondo).
49 The "independent review" procedure provided for in Article 4 of the WTO
Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspection was set up to limit legal liability for dam-
ages caused by dispute settlement rulings. The procedure was invoked for the
first time in 2005.
50 Case C-377/98, Netherlands v. Eur. Par. & Coun., 2001 E.C.R. 1-07079, para.
52. On economic and social rights under the ECJ, see ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
RIGHTS UNDER THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS -A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE
(Tamara K. Hervey & Jeff Kenner eds., 2003) (presenting several articles with
varying viewpoints on economic and social rights under the EU Charter of Fun-
damental Rights).
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interpretation of WTO rules.51 The various reports by
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the
human rights implications of WTO agreements offer
many examples for the potential relevance of human
rights for the interpretation of WTO rules.5 2 ECJ juris-
prudence interpreting the customs union rules in the
EC Treaty in conformity with the human rights guaran-
tees in the ECHR illustrates that judicial balancing of
human rights and trade rules may require methodo-
logical approaches different from those of international
trade law. 3 Just as judgments of the ECtHR (e.g., on
the right to the inviolability of the home and protection
51 A computer search of references to human rights in WTO panel and Ap-
pellate Body reports indicates very few reports where parties, third-parties, ex-
perts, panelists, or the Appellate Body referred to human rights. Neither the
WTO Ministerial Declaration of November 2001 on access to medicines nor Article
27.3(b) of the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS")
Agreement on patenting plant varieties refers to human rights, even though the
Africa Group invoked human rights as criteria for interpreting TRIPS during ne-
gotiations on the Declaration.
52 See, e.g., U.N. Econ. and Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on the Pro-
motion and Prot. of Human Rights, Report of the High Commissioner on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of In-
tellectual Property Rights on Human Rights, 1 10-19, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (June 27, 2001) (discussing how the TRIPS Agreement is
relevant to human rights).
53 See Case C-112/00, Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planztige
v. Austria, 2003 E.C.R. 1-5659, para. 16 (ruling on whether the failure of authorities
to ban a demonstration amounted to an unjustified restriction of the free move-
ment of goods). The Court held that while the Austrian authorization of an envi-
ronmental demonstration blocking road traffic on the Austrian motorway was a
trade barrier contrary to Article 30 of the EC Treaty, it was justified by freedom of
expression and assembly concerns (Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR). Id. at para.
59. The Court avoided squeezing this human rights justification into the tradi-
tional trade law exception in Article 34 or into its rule of reasonable interpretation
in Article 30 of the EC Treaty. Rather, it directly applied human rights law as a
new justificatory category, referring to the "wide margin of discretion" that com-
petent authorities have to find a "fair balance" between common market freedoms
and human rights, as well as the need to determine "whether the restrictions
placed upon intra-Community trade are proportionate in the light of the legiti-
mate objective pursued, namely, in the present case, the protection of fundamen-
tal rights." Id. at para. 82. Such a fair balance must also be struck in the interpre-
tation of WTO rules. The ECJ balancing approach rightly implies that invocation
of human rights as a justification of trade restrictions may not automatically
trump trade rules designed to limit protectionist abuses (e.g., procedural WTO
requirements to carry out a transparent risk-assessment procedure before prohib-
iting the importation of hormone-fed beef).
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of freedom of speech in the commercial field) have im-
plications for the judicial interpretation and application
of the trade and economic provisions in the EC Treaty,
54
the case law of the UN and regional and national hu-
man rights bodies have legal relevance for the future in-
terpretation of WTO rules.
5 5
9. WTO law may be applicable to, or provide relevant le-
gal context for, investment disputes covered today by
more than 2100 bilateral investment treaties ("BITs"),
with comprehensive guarantees for intergovernmental,
investor-state, and national dispute settlement proceed-
ings. 56 For instance, WTO law and disputes over dis-
crimination of foreign services suppliers or intellectual
property rights may be relevant for interpreting the na-
tional treatment obligations of host states in related in-
vestment disputes covered by BITs and ICSID jurisdic-
tion. Additionally, the preferential legal and judicial
remedies offered by bilateral BITs may be inconsistent
with the nondiscrimination requirements under GATS
Articles II and XVII. Providers of services and holders
of intellectual property rights will have to examine very
carefully the alternative dispute settlement fora for en-
forcing their private rights and the corresponding gov-
54 See Dean Spielmann, Human Rights Case Law in the Strasbourg and Luxem-
bourg Courts: Conflicts, Inconsistencies, and Complementarities, in THE EU AND
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 14, at 757-780 (comparing ECJ and ECHR case law).
On the often broader judicial protection that human rights courts give freedom of
commercial speech, see Hertel v. Switzerland, 1998 Eur. Ct. H.R. 77, sec. 10, para.
27 (concluding that restrictions on freedom of speech imposed under the Swiss
Unfair Competition Law were in violation of Article 10 of the ECHR).
55 See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ESOSOC], Sub-Comm. on the Promo-
tion and Prot. of Human Rights, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Liberalization
of Trade in Services and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9 (June 25,
2002) (examining issues concerning human rights and trade).
56 See Gaetan Verhoosel, The Use of Investor-State Arbitration under Bilateral In-
vestment Treaties to Seek Relief for Breaches of VWTO Law, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 493, 493-
506 (2003) (explaining the effect of WTO law on bilateral investment treaties
("BITs")); see also U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: AN OVERVIEW, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/13, U.N. Sales No.
E.99.II.D.23 (1999) (discussing the developments in the international legal frame-
work for foreign direct investment); Giorgio Sacerdoti, Bilateral Treaties and Multi-
lateral Instruments on Investment Protection, 136 RECUEIL DES COURS 234, 234-329
(1997) (providing an example of the same).
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ernment obligations. In the field of international tele-
communications, for example, the WTO panel report for
Mexico-Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services
illustrates that market access, national treatment, and
other commitments (e.g., for competition rules) ac-
cepted by WTO members for the liberalization of inter-
national telecommunications services are justiciable and
enforceable through the WTO dispute settlement sys-
tem.57 By contrast, the alternative arbitration proce-
dures of the International Telecommunications Union
("ITU") have never been applied thus far:
[Tiraditional ITU dispute settlement procedures,
with their application restricted to ITU Member
States and limited to matters related to the interpre-
tation and application of the ITU instruments, are
not of any use to the ever growing number of pri-
vate sector telecommunications services and equip-
ment providers independent of governments or
quasi-governmental organizations.
58
10. The numerous WTO guarantees of private access to
domestic courts (e.g., GATT Article X, Article 13 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article 23 of the
Agreement on Subsidies, and TRIPS Articles 32 and
41-50) have given rise to an increasing number of
parallel or successive dispute settlement proceed-
ings in domestic courts and before WTO dispute set-
tlement bodies on, for example, the review of anti-
57 See Panel Report, Mexico-Measures affecting Telecommunications Services,
WT/DS204/R (April 2, 2004) (addressing the dispute surrounding provisions in
Mexico's domestic laws and regulations on telecommunications).
58 Alfons A.E. Noll, The Various Approaches to Dispute Settlement Concerning
International Telecommunications, in ARBITRATION IN AIR, SPACE AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 161, 171 (2002). Noll distinguishes between purely
telecommunication sector-specific disputes and those that are more concerned
with trade in telecommunications services that are regulated by the GATS. He
suggests coordinating International Telecommunications Union ("ITU") dispute
settlement procedures (limited to ITU instruments and Member States) and WTO
dispute settlement procedures pursuant to Article V of the WTO Agreement and
Section 7 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS") Annex on
Telecommunications.
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dumping determinations, countervailing duty de-
terminations, government procurement practices,
and regulation of intellectual property rights. As
goods and services are produced and consumed by
individuals, WTO dispute settlement panels have
emphasized that "one of the primary objects of the
GATT/WTO ... is to produce certain market condi-
tions which would allow.., individual activity to
flourish" by protecting the international division of
labor against discriminatory trade restrictions and
other distortions.59 Yet the same dispute settlement
panel also emphasized that "[nieither the GATT nor
the WTO has so far been interpreted by
GATT/WTO institutions as a legal order producing
direct effect." 60 In other words, neither institution
created rights and obligations that extend beyond
WTO members to individual traders, producers,
and consumers. WTO obligations have been recog-
nized as an "integral part of the Community legal
order" inside the EC and have been incorporated
into the domestic laws of many WTO member
States. But the ECJ-like the domestic courts of
some other WTO members-has concluded from
the intergovernmental structures and reciprocity
principles of WTO law that the "purpose of the
WTO agreements is to govern relations between
States or regional organisations for economic inte-
gration and not to protect individuals" who, as a
consequence, "cannot rely on them before the courts
59 See Panel Report, United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974,
7.73 et seq., WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999) (addressing the EC's concern regarding
the specific, strict time limits within which unilateral determinations and trade
sanctions must be laid out) [hereinafter Trade Act of 1974 Panel Report].
60 See id. at 7.72.
The fact that WTO institutions have not to date construed any obliga-
tions as producing direct effect does not necessarily preclude that in the
legal system of any given Member, following internal constitutional
principles, some obligations will be found to give rights to individuals.
Our statement of fact does not prejudge any decisions by national
courts on this issue.
Id. at n.661.
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and... any infringement of them will not give rise
to non-contractual liability on the part of the Com-
munity."61 As a result of the widespread disregard
of WTO rules by domestic courts, parallel or succes-
sive dispute settlement proceedings in domestic
courts and before WTO dispute settlement panels
often lead to conflicting or otherwise inconsistent
decisions entailing legal insecurity, high transaction
costs, and challenges to the legitimacy of intergov-
ernmental WTO rules and secretive WTO dispute
settlement procedures.
In contrast to the vast literature and judicial practice concern-
ing forum shopping and ADR in private international litigation,
the respective merits and venue choices of concurrent jurisdictions
for international disputes over governmental restrictions (e.g.,
taxes and non-tariff trade barriers) and governmental trade distor-
tions (e.g., subsidies and trade discrimination), as well as the re-
lated problems of ADR, have not been studied extensively in pub-
lic international trade law. Many of the several hundred bilateral,
regional, and worldwide trade and economic agreements provide
for political and legal dispute settlement procedures with overlap-
ping jurisdictions and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.
Therefore, choosing the right dispute prevention and settlement fo-
rum as well as avoiding less advantageous dispute settlement fora
are important tasks in international trade policy and public trade
law, as will be discussed in Section 4. Section 5 discusses examples
and case studies of ADR in public international trade and invest-
ment law. Views on the optimal negotiation or judicial forum may
differ depending on whether one focuses on the interests of the
governments involved or on the private economic interests affected
by the dispute. Section 6 distinguishes five different categories of
international trade disputes based on the conflicts of interests un-
derlying the dispute concerned and recommends different conflict
61 Case T-201/00, Etablissements Biret et SA v. EU Council, 2003 E.C.R. I-
10497 62-65.
[It is only where the Community intended to implement a particular ob-
ligation assumed in the context of the WTO, or where the Community
measure refers expressly to the precise provisions in the WTO agree-
ments, that it is for the Community judicature to review the legality of
the Community measure in question in the light of the WTO rules.
Id. at 63.
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prevention and dispute settlement procedures for each category of
international dispute. Section 7 concludes with a few policy rec-
ommendations for additional international rules on the prevention
of international trade disputes and the coordination of concurrent
jurisdictions for judicial dispute settlement proceedings.
4. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT METHODS IN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: AN OVERVIEW
Disputes are characterized by: (1) specific disagreements con-
cerning matters of fact, law, or policy between (2) two or more par-
ties so that (3) a claim or assertion by one party is met with refusal,
counterclaim, or denial by another. In order to distinguish dis-
putes from divergent claims, disputes may be defined by the addi-
tional criterion that (4) one or more parties requires the dispute to
be settled by recourse to additional dispute settlement proce-
dures.62 The close interrelationships between intergovernmental
and private disputes are reflected in many WTO dispute settlement
reports -for instance when WTO panels emphasized that disputes
among trading countries and violations of WTO rules usually re-
sult from discriminatory treatment by WTO member governments
of producers, traders, or other individual participants in the mar-
ket place:
Trade is conducted most often and increasingly by private
operators. It is through improved conditions for these pri-
vate operators that Members benefit from the WTO disci-
plines. The denial of benefits to a Member which flows
from a breach is often indirect and results from the impact
of the breach on the market place and the activities of indi-
viduals within it.
63
This Section begins with a brief overview of the ten traditional
dispute settlement methods in public international law (Section
4.1). It then explains why, from a citizen's perspective, these inter-
governmental methods are often neither legally effective nor eco-
nomically efficient methods for preventing or settling disputes
among private producers, investors, traders, consumers, and for-
62 See Franklin Berman, Legal Theories of International Dispute Prevention and
Dispute Settlement: Lessons for the Transatlantic Partnership, in TRANSATLANTIC
ECONOMIC DISPUTES, supra note 43, at 451-64 (explaining alternative dispute set-
tlement procedures).
63 Trade Act of 1974 Panel Report, supra note 59, at 7.77.
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eign governments (Section 4.2). As many intergovernmental WTO
disputes are triggered by private complaints (e.g., pursuant to the
complaint procedures provided for in Section 301 of the U.S. Trade
Act or the corresponding procedures in the EC's Trade Barriers
Regulation) and many WTO dispute settlement proceedings are
carried out through private-public partnerships among the private
complainants and their government representatives in the WTO, 64
examining one's best alternative to a negotiated agreement
("BATNA")65 and the most appropriate ADR methods must be the
starting point for successful litigation or dispute prevention strate-
gies (Section 4.3).
4.1. The Ten Traditional Dispute Settlement Methods in Public
International Law and WVTO Law
The numerous international dispute settlement treaties con-
cluded since the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions for the Pacific
Settlement of Disputes 66 tend to distinguish ten different interna-
tional dispute settlement methods: (1) bilateral or multilateral ne-
gotiations; (2) good offices; (3) mediation; (4) inquiries; (5) concilia-
tion; (6) ad hoc or institutionalized arbitration; (7) judicial
settlement by permanent courts; (8) "resort to regional agencies or
arrangements" or (9) to "other peaceful means of their own
choice"; 67 and (10) dispute settlement by the UN Security Council
(e.g., pursuant to Articles 34-38 of the UN Charter), other UN or-
gans, or other international organizations.68 Many international
treaties, including the UN Charter and the WTO Agreement, view
these political and legal procedures as complementary options and
define the conditions for their use. The international law principles
of free choice of means and international consent are preconditions
64 See SHAFFER, supra note 40.
65 See FISHER & URY, supra note 9 (noting the importance of examining one's
best alternative to a negotiated agreement ("BATNA")).
66 See KARIN OELLERS-FRAHM & ANDREAS ZIMMERMANN, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: TEXTs AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2001) (providing a stan-
dard compilation of texts and materials on dispute settlement in public international
law); see also UNITED NATIONS, HANDBOOK ON THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
BETWEEN STATES (1992) (describing the settlement of disputes between states and
disputes involving parties other than states).
67 The quoted texts are from U.N. Charter, art. 33, para. 1 (listing the alterna-
tive dispute settlement procedures under the UN Charter).
68 For explanations of the differences among these procedures, see, e.g., J. G.
MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (3rd ed. 1998).
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for international adjudication and require that-apart from the
general international law obligation to "settle their international
disputes by peaceful means" 69-no single method of dispute set-
tlement is legally privileged over any other, unless countries agree
otherwise (e.g., in Article 23 of the DSU and Article 292 of the EC
Treaty).
After the creation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 1899
and the PCIJ in 1920, negotiations have remained the principal
means for the prevention or settlement of disputes among states.
Bilateral negotiations and third-party-assisted political methods of
dispute settlement can offer important advantages, including: (1)
greater flexibility, privacy, and control by the parties over the out-
come; (2) comparatively less costs; (3) the ability to take into ac-
count political as well as legal considerations; and (4) avoidance of
"winner-loser" situations. However, notwithstanding the increas-
ing number of international treaty provisions on good offices, me-
diation, inquiry, and conciliation, these third-party-assisted diplo-
matic means of international dispute settlement (e.g., commissions
of inquiry and conciliation commissions) are less frequently in-
voked in international economic relations than alternative legal
methods of adjudication, arbitration, or (quasi-)judicial dispute set-
tlement mechanisms.70 Diplomatic methods of dispute settlement,
such as voluntary export restraints, are often criticized as being
power-oriented and not sufficiently focused on the merits of each
party's case. They are thought to weaken the previously agreed-
upon rules and undermine legal security.
Legal dispute settlement methods enable rule-oriented, legally
binding decisions by independent judges that are based on due
process of law and substantive rules upon which the parties have
previously agreed as reflecting the long-term interests of the par-
ties to the dispute. According to Article 92 of the UN Charter, 71 the
ICJ was to become the "principal judicial organ" for the settlement
of disputes among UN Member States. 72 Yet less than a third of the
69 U.N. Charter art. 2.3.
70 See id.; see also Christine Chinkin, Alternative Dispute Resolution under Inter-
national Law, in REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE INSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA 123,
124 (Malcolm D. Evans ed. 1998) (noting that despite the range of institutional
methods of dispute resolution, they are not used universally).
71 U.N. Charter art. 92, para. 1.
72 See SHANY, supra note 31, at 273 (citing several characteristics of the ICJ
that make it "a leading candidate" as a "universal appellate court").
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191 UN Member States have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction
of the ICJ,73 an acceptance often subject to reservations. The fewer
than 100 contentious disputes submitted to the ICJ since 1946
mainly concerned disputes over territorial delimitation and bilat-
eral treaties. Only a few economic and investment disputes were
submitted to the ICJ;74 international trade disputes were hardly
ever decided by the ICJ or by its predecessor, the PCIJ.75 Due to the
lack of standing of individuals and nongovernmental, as well as
intergovernmental, organizations before the ICJ76 (in addition to
the long duration and numerous shortcomings of ICJ procedures),
the prospects of transforming the ICJ into a true world court with
mandatory universal jurisdiction-e.g., for resolving jurisdictional
disputes resulting from competing jurisdictional claims (similar to
the task of the ECJ in relation to disputes arising under the Brussels
and Lugano Conventions on the jurisdiction of national courts for
transboundary disputes)- are slim. Most states appear unwilling
to "accept the empowerment of the ICJ to hear many cases, which
[they] have excluded from its compulsory jurisdiction for a good
reason (e.g., lack of sufficient expertise in specific complex fields of
law)." 77 Just as many ECHR Member States have submitted reser-
vations limiting the jurisdiction of the UN Human Rights Commit-
73 See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, para. 2 & 5, June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 933; see also SHANY, supra note 31, at 274, n.12 ("Only
64 of the 190 parties to the ICJ statute have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction
of the ICJ.").
74 See Sean D. Murphy, The ELSI Case: An Investment Dispute at the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 391, 442 (1991) ("[Tlhe ICJ rarely enters
into the world of international trade and investment ... ").
75 See U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Dispute Settlement General Topics
1.2: International Court of Justice, 5, 35-37, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.19
(2003) (prepared by Pemmaraju S. Rao) (stating that the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice ("PCIJ") handled only twenty nine cases and gave twenty seven
advisory opinions); Gtinther Jaenicke, International Trade Conflicts before the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice, in
ADJUDICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUrES IN INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW 43, 44 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Gtinther Jaenicke eds., 1992)
(remarking that many states use separately negotiated treaties to submit disputes
between the parties to the ICJ rather than accepting the "optional clause" of art. 36
of the ICJ statute).
76 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Adjudica-
tion: How to Constitutionalize the UN Dispute Settlement System?, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 753, 789 (1999).
77 See SHANY, supra note 31, at 273-77 (discussing roles the ICJ could play in
resolving jurisdictional disputes, as well as barriers that prevent its accession to
those roles).
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tee for complaints under the Optional Protocol to the UN Covenant
on Civil and Political Human Rights if the same complaint is pend-
ing before the ECtHR, so too have WTO members and members of
regional economic integration agreements (e.g., the EC, the Euro-
pean Economic Area, and NAFTA) provided for exclusive jurisdic-
tion of regional and worldwide economic courts (e.g., the ECJ,
EFTA, and WTO dispute settlement bodies) rather than for ICJ ju-
risdiction over related trade and human rights disputes. Any con-
flicts of jurisdiction and related problems of forum choice must be
decided by the dispute settlement body seized by the complainant.
The legal methods for the settlement of international economic
disputes are characterized by an increasing proliferation of world-
wide and regional courts and quasi-judicial dispute settlement
procedures (e.g., at the WTO), with increasing reliance on alterna-
tive dispute settlement methods such as mixed international arbi-
tration between a state and a private party or private commercial
arbitration administered by an intergovernmental organization
(e.g., the WIPO arbitration center or WTO commercial arbitration
in complaints against preshipment inspection companies). All the
major alternative dispute settlement methods under public interna-
tional law (e.g., bilateral and multilateral consultations, good of-
fices, conciliation, mediation, panel and appellate review proce-
dures, arbitration, and national and international adjudication) are
available in WTO law for the prevention and settlement of interna-
tional trade disputes. In contrast to the restrictive ICJ practice un-
der Articles 62 and 63 of its Statute with regard to intervention by
third parties,7 8 GATT and WTO dispute settlement proceedings are
characterized by frequent participation of third parties in consulta-
tions, panel proceedings, and appellate review as a means of
avoiding conflict and preventing separate, additional disputes.
79
78 See CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 178-80 (1993)
(arguing that while Article 63 of the ICJ statute was intended to provide interven-
tion as a right, the ICJ has interpreted it much more narrowly); SHABTAI ROSENNE,
INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 1, 3 (1993) (stating that "the
Court's decisions on intervention under Article 62... are unduly restrictive," in
part because the ICJ requires "an interest of a legal nature" in addition to the re-
quirement of Article 81 2(c) that there be some "basis of jurisdiction ... between
the State applying to intervene and the parties to the case").
79 Cf WTO SECRETARIAT, LEGAL AFFAIRS DIV. AND APPELLATE BODY, A
HANDBOOK ON THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 47, 50, 65-66 (2004) (discussing
procedures for intervention in consultations, adjudicatory panels, and the appellate
process); Mary E. Footer, Some Aspects of Third Party Intervention in GATTA/WTO Dis-
pute Settlement Proceedings, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE GATT/WTO
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The rights under Article 4.11 of the DSU80 of third-party WTO
members with a "substantial trade interest" to request joining con-
sultations under GATT Article XXI181 (or under the analogous pro-
visions of other covered agreements) are frequently exercised, just
as multiple complaints by more than one WTO member pursuant
to Article 9 of the DSU are frequent in WTO dispute settlement
practice. In the 1996 and 1997 panel proceedings against the EC's
import restrictions for bananas, for instance, there were five com-
plainants, eight WTO members intervening in support of these
"multiple complainants," and twelve WTO member countries in-
tervening in support of the EC as defendant (the fifteen EC Mem-
ber States participated in the dispute as part of the EC delegation
without a formal status as codefendants or third parties).
4.2. Mhy Intergovernmental Dispute Settlement Methods Are Often
Suboptimal in International Economic Law
Most international trade and economic transactions take place
between private producers, investors, traders, and consumers. In-
ternational trade disputes are about how to reconcile the respective
interests of producers, investors, traders, and consumers with the
public interests of the exporting and importing countries involved.
Optimal dispute prevention and dispute settlement methods
should aim at regulating these conflicts of interests in a
non-discriminatory and welfare-enhancing manner (i.e. by limiting
welfare-reducing border discrimination) and should legally protect
and empower all the actors involved to defend their legitimate
rights and resolve disputes under decentralized, fair procedures.
Effective dispute prevention and settlement are characterized by
ever more precise national, international, and transnational guar-
antees of equal freedoms and by rules of law limiting abuses of
power in national, international, and transnational relations for the
benefit of legally protected freedom, nondiscriminatory conditions
of competition, and respect for human rights. As rules do not en-
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 211, 235-44 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997) (dis-
cussing the prevalence of third-party intervention in a variety of dispute-resolution
processes under the Dispute Settlement Understanding); Friedl Weiss, Third Parties
in GATTI/WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings, in LIBER AMICORUM PAUL DE WAART
458-72 (1998) (discussing the role of third parties in the WTO dispute resolution
process).
80 See DSU, supra note 33, art. 4.11.
81 See generally GATT, supra note 29, art. 22.
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force themselves, rule of law depends on effective legal and judi-
cial remedies, as reflected in the human right of access to justice.
The struggle for rights and the judicial protection and balancing of
rights are often necessary elements for the clarification, progressive
development, and effectiveness of rules.
From the point of view of private economic operators, follow-
ing the traditional international law rules on prior exhaustion of
local remedies82 and subsequent espousal of private claims against
foreign governments by the home state in order to initiate diplo-
matic protection and intergovernmental court proceedings often
means that international legal and judicial remedies may only be-
come available many years after the dispute arose. For example,
the judgment by the ICJ in the ELSI dispute between the United
States and Italy over the treatment of U.S. investors in Palermo was
rendered in 1989, more than 25 years after the investment dispute
arose in Italy.83 The ELSI judgment has been subject to severe criti-
cism in academic literature. 84 The two and a half years between the
institution of ICJ proceedings on February 6, 1987 and the render-
ing of final judgment on July 20, 1989,85 as well as the twelve public
hearings held by the ICJ so it could listen to the numerous agents,
counsel, and advocates representing the two states,8 6 indicate that
ICJ proceedings tend to last longer and cost more than ICSID arbi-
tration or WNTO panel proceedings. The lack of private access to
the ICJ, the virtual absence of damage awards rendered by the ICJ,
and the rare use of expert and witness testimony before the ICJ
8 7
are among the many reasons why private access to EC courts,
EFTA, NAFTA or ICSID arbitration, without prior exhaustion of
local remedies,8 8 are often perceived by businesses as more appro-
82 See F. A. Mann, Foreign Investment in the International Court of Justice: The
ELSI Case, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 92, 101 (1992) (referring to the traditional international
rules on exhaustion of local remedies).
83 See Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, 23-40 (July 20) (de-
tailing the extended history of the case) [ELSI].
84 See Mann, supra note 82, at 93-99 (critiquing ICJ procedures and reason-
ing).
85 See ELSI, 1989 I.C.J. at 17 (describing the history and general overview of
the case).
86 See id. at 18 (noting the number of sittings).
87 See Mann, supra note 82, at 94-95 (describing the inexperience of many of
the court's judges with respect to witnesses, as well as the need for better witness
procedures).
88 According to Article 26 of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, (Aug. 27, 1965), 17 U.S.T.
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priate for the settlement of international trade and investment dis-
putes and reparation claims.
89
In private national and international commercial law, ADR is
increasingly recognized as an important alternative to adversarial
arbitration or court litigation, where higher costs, longer duration,
and (sometimes) reduced predictability (e.g., in cases involving ju-
ries and punitive damages) are viewed as less advantageous. 90 The
various ADR methods, such as mediation, neutral expert appraisal,
and mini-trials, differ from judicial procedures in that there is an
agreed-upon intervention of a disinterested third party who helps
the parties settle their dispute in a more flexible, expeditious, con-
fidential, and less costly manner without rendering a legally bind-
ing decision.91 The voluntary, nonbinding and informal character
of some ADR proceedings ensures that parties can exercise control
over their dispute and allows them to focus on producing
"win-win" solutions that save time and costs and strengthen per-
sonal and business relationships among the parties to the dispute.
92
ADR is considered particularly beneficial for international com-
mercial relations and disputes among parties from different legal
systems and cultures, especially if both parties are interested in
continued long-term cooperation, their dispute is not about a prin-
cipal point of law, and there is no discrepancy regarding their re-
spective bargaining power and positions. 93 Once a mutually ac-
1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (1966), "[a] Contracting State may require the exhaustion of
local administrative or judicial remedies as a condition of its consent to arbitration
under this Convention."
89 See, e.g,. Murphy, supra note 74, at 442 (1991) ("Typically, the ICJ does not
have extensive expert and witness testimony, although increased use of such tes-
timony have [sic] become more prevalent the past several years.").
90 See, e.g., A. J. Eijsbouts, ADR and Arbitration: Advantages and Disadvantages
in Commercial Disputes, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HAGUE'S 750TH
ANNIVERSARY 223, 223-28 (Wybo P. Heere ed., 1999) (discussing the merits of Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR")); Piet A. Wackie Eysten, Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Commercial Disputes, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HAGUE'S 750TH
ANNIVERSARY at 219 (Wybo P. Heere ed., 1999) (echoing comments by Eijsbouts);
ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 31 (3rd ed. 1999) (giving increasing costs and the possi-
bility of lengthy proceedings of litigations which require the time of corporate
leaders as reasons to employ ADR).
91 See id. at 24-31, 33, 36, 38-39.
92 See id. at 32-33, 33 n.37, 41 (discussing the possibility of achieving
"win-win" results through ADR and situations in which ADR can be conducive to
future business dealings).
93 See id. at 41-42 (highlighting situations which might call for ADR and those
that do not).
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ceptable settlement agreement is signed, the result of ADR may be-
come legally binding, ideally without leaving a loser and without
being limited to traditional court remedies (such as specific per-
formance, rescission of the contract, or damages).
94
4.3. Public-Private Partnerships in WTO Litigation: The Need to
Examine One's BATNA
Only WTO members may be parties to WTO dispute settlement
proceedings. Yet many WTO complaints are triggered by private
domestic complaints, for instance pursuant to Section 301 of the
U.S. Trade Act 95 and the EC's corresponding Trade Barriers Regu-
lation.96 This private origin of many WTO disputes is reflected in
the designation of many WTO disputes by the names of the com-
panies involved (e.g., Kodak-Fuji, Pernod-Ricard, and Bacardi-
Martini). WTO litigation is typically characterized by "the forma-
tion of public-private partnerships to pursue varying, but comple-
mentary, goals."97 This blurring of public and private interests in
international trade law renders it even more important to clarify:
whose interests should intergovernmental consultations, media-
tion, conciliation, panel, Appellate Body or arbitration proceedings
at the WTO serve?
The answer given by public international lawyers - that gov-
ernments are supposed to serve the public interest -cannot explain
the political reality that governments often violate their WTO obli-
gations or resort to intergovernmental WTO dispute settlement
proceedings in order to protect powerful group interests in ex-
change for their political support. For example, several WTO
complaints initiated by the United States, such as against EC im-
port restrictions on bananas, were linked to election campaign
promises in exchange for financial campaign contributions in U.S.
federal elections. In the case of WTO complaints by less-developed
WTO members with limited administrative and legal resources, the
private petitioners (e.g., an export industry) sometimes prepare the
complaint, cover the costs for outside legal counsel, and participate
with the governmental legal team of the WTO member presenting
94 See id. at 32-39 (describing various forms of ADR, some of which are bind-
ing and offer a wide variety of advantages).
95 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2000).
96 Council Regulation 3286/94, 1994 O.J. (L 349) 71. See MOLYNEUX, supra
note 17 (discussing the sources of complaints relating to EC law).
97 SHAFFER, supra note 40, at 4.
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the complaint in the intergovernmental dispute settlement pro-
ceeding. Also, NAFTA rules and dispute settlement procedures
are often characterized by a one-sided focus on business interests,
which, compared to European integration law, appear less con-
strained by public interest clauses. 9 Dispute prevention and reso-
lution may therefore require multilevel negotiations not only be-
tween governments but also among the private parties concerned,
as well as among the private parties and their respective govern-
ments.
Negotiation theories emphasize the importance of bearing in
mind one's BATNA so as to make sure that the negotiation produces
better results than those that may be obtained unilaterally without
negotiation. If the primary interest lies in judicial clarification of the
contested meaning of an existing legal obligation so as to avoid fu-
ture disputes, unilateral recourse to compulsory jurisdiction (e.g., a
WTO panel, the EC Court of Justice, or a national court) may be the
preferred BATNA. If the BATNA of a weaker party does not include
the possibility of unilaterally submitting the dispute to previously
agreed-upon compulsory jurisdiction (e.g., in disputes involving the
majority of UN members that have not recognized the compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ), a more powerful party may be tempted to use
its bargaining power and oppose a request by a weaker party to
submit the dispute to third-party adjudication. Game theory teaches
that the principle of predictable "tit-for-tat" offers the best strategy
for promoting reciprocal cooperation among egoists in a decentral-
ized context where, as in many fields of international law, there is no
central authority that can enforce agreed-upon international rules. 99
For example, the fact that least-developed countries ("LDCs")
have only rarely been complainants or defendants in WTO panel
proceedings appears to be due not to a lack of disputes but rather
to a preference for settling disputes involving LDCs without re-
course to costly WTO dispute settlement proceedings, particularly
in view of the fact that most of their exports take place under vol-
98 See generally North American Free Trade Agreement ch. 11, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
Jan. 1 1994, 32 I.L.M. 612 (providing, for example in art. 1110, that nationalized or
expropriated investments should be compensated according to fair market value)
[hereinafter NAFTA].
99 See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 31, 175, 178-79 (1984)
(describing the victory of a "tit-for-tat" strategy in a computerized Prisoner's Di-
lemma tournament and suggesting that the results of the tournament are evidence
that a "tit-for-tat" approach can promote the evolution of cooperation without re-
course to authority).
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untary tariff preferences granted under the 1979 GATT Decision on
Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity, and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries ("Enabling Clause") 100 and
pursuant to special WTO waivers -such as those for EC tariff pref-
erences under the Cotonou Agreement with seventy-seven African,
Caribbean, and Pacific countries.10 1 Notwithstanding the legal ser-
vices offered to LDCs by the independent Advisory Center for
WTO Law,10 2 LDCs may conclude that they lack the legal, eco-
nomic, and professional resources for costly and time-intensive
WTO litigation, as well as adequate private support from their ex-
port industries to prepare a WTO complaint. The prospective
trade remedies offered by WTO law'0 3 may also be less attractive
for LDCs than alternative financial reparation that may be avail-
able in alternative dispute settlement proceedings. However, given
the asymmetries in bargaining power between LDCs and their de-
veloped trading partners, some LDCs (like Bangladesh) have re-
course to the special legal services offered by the Advisory Center
and, to a limited extent, by the WTO (e.g., Article 27:2 of the DSU)
for clarifying their relevant rights, obligations, and most advanta-
geous dispute settlement strategies. Joint multilateral consulta-
tions, renegotiation of WTO rules (e.g., in the Doha Development
Round), or requests for ad hoc waivers may be more favorable dis-
pute prevention strategies for LDCs than WTO litigation. The fact
that both WTO legal advisers as well as the Advisory Center have,
in a number of cases, advised less-developed countries against ini-
100 But cf Panel Report, European Communities- Conditions for the Granting of
Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, 7.60, 7.177 WT/DS264/R (Dec. 1, 2003),
WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004) (finding certain EC trade preferences inconsis-
tent with Article 1:1 of GATT 1994 and the Enabling Clause) [hereinafter Panel
Report].
101 See The Coutonou Agreement: Overview of the Agreement 2000, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/cotonou/overviewen.htm
(last visited Apr. 8, 2006) (discussing the economic strategies employed under the
Agreement and the anticipated benefits thereof).
102 The Advisory Center on WTO Law was created by an international
agreement signed by twenty-nine countries at the WTO Ministerial Meeting in
Seattle on December 1999 and entered into force in July 2001. The Center is an in-
ternational organization independent from the WTO and currently has thirty-
seven member countries. In addition to the twenty-seven less-developed member
countries, forty-three least-developed countries are entitled to the services of the
Center without being members. ACWL-Members: Introduction, http://www.
acwl.ch/e/members/members-e.aspx (last visited Apr. 8, 2006). Its annual re-
ports are published on its website at http://www.acwl.ch/e/tools/doc-e.aspx.
103 See DSU, supra note 33, arts. 3.7 & 19.
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tiating WTO panel proceedings illustrates that dispute avoidance
remains a primary objective of the WTO dispute settlement system.
5. ADR AT THE WTO: SOME CASE STUDIES
Prior to the entry into force of the WTO Agreement in 1995, in-
ternational trade, investment, and intellectual property law had
evolved in separate institutional frameworks (i.e., through GATT,
WIPO, and the World Bank group) that provided for separate dis-
pute settlement procedures (e.g., GATT Article XXIII,
10 4 the ICJ,
and the ICSID). By contrast, WTO law covers not only interna-
tional trade in goods and services but also trade-related intellectual
property rights and trade-related investments (e.g., under the
WTO Agreements on Trade-Related Investment Measures
("TRIMS"), 05 GATS, 10 6 and the Agreement on Government Pro-
curement'0 7). The DSU offers members the choice of bilateral and
multilateral consultations, 08 good offices, conciliation and media-
tion,109 dispute settlement panels,110 appellate review,' and arbi-
tration.112 Article 23 of the DSU requires WTO members to settle
their disputes about the interpretation and (non-)application of
WTO rules using WTO dispute settlement procedures."
3 This ob-
ligation to have recourse to "compulsory WTO jurisdiction" does
not, however, obviate the need to examine ADR options.
114
104 GATT, supra note 29, art. 23.
105 Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, The
Legal Texts-Results of the Uruguay Round 143 (1999) 1868 U.N.T.S. 186 [herein-
after TRIMS]. [not reproduced in I.L.M.].
106 See General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. 22, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, The Le-
gal Texts-Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 185, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994)
[hereinafter GATS].
107 See Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 4(b), 1915 U.N.T.S.
103 (1996).
108 See DSU, supra note 33, art. 4.
109 Id. art. 5.
110 Id. arts. 6-16.
111 Id. art. 17.
112 Id. arts. 22-23 (providing enforcement procedures for the WTO dispute
settlement system); Id. art. 25 DSU (providing for mutually agreed-upon arbitra-
tion).
113 Id. art. 23.
114 ADR is usually defined as "an umbrella term that refers generally to alter-
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5.1. The Havana Club Dispute in the WTO: Private Intellectual
Property Disputes Should Not Be Converted into International
Political Disputes Unnecessarily
The Havana Club dispute between the EC and the United States
in the WTO arose from a private commercial dispute between Per-
nod-Ricard, a France-based multinational distiller and distributor,
and Bacardi-Martini, a U.S.-based multinational distiller and dis-
tributor, over their rights in the trademark "Havana Club." 115
Each company was fully cognizant that its respective claims to the
trademark remained controversial in view of the nationalization of
the trademark rights by the Cuban government in the early 1960s.
After having litigated their dispute in U.S. courts, the companies
succeeded in transforming their private dispute into an intergov-
ernmental challenge of world trade rules with the risk of transat-
lantic trade sanctions. Submission of their private dispute to pri-
vate third-party arbitration or mediation (e.g., at WIPO's
arbitration center) might have avoided the international political
dispute and might have clarified the private rights involved more
quickly and effectively.
The intergovernmental EC complaint was directed against Sec-
tion 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act, passed by the United
States in 1998. The prime issue before the WTO panel and Appel-
late Body was whether Section 211, notably its ban on the protec-
tion and recognition of trademarks and trade names in connection
with Cuban business relations, was compatible with TRIPS. 116 The
Appellate Body, applying the rules of TRIPS and the Paris Conven-
tion on Industrial Property, confirmed the panel's view that Article
natives to the court adjudication of disputes such as negotiation, mediation, arbi-
tration, mini-trial and summary jury trial." JACQUELINE M. NOLAN-HALEY,
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN A NUTSHELL 1-2 (2001). In this book, the term
ADR is used to refer to all alternative political and legal national and international
dispute resolution options. See also U.N. Conf. on Trade and Dev., Course on Dis-
pute Settlement: Good Offices, Mediation and Conciliation of International Trade and In-
vestment Disputes (2003) (prepared by K. Venkata Raman) (surveying ADR proce-
dures and practices in international law) [hereinafter Course on Dispute
Settlement].
115 See Frederick M. Abbott & Thomas Cottier, Dispute Prevention and Dispute
Settlement in the Field of Intellectual Property Rights and Electronic Commerce: US -
Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act 1998 ("Havana Club"), in TRANSATLANTIC
ECONOMIC DISPUTES, supra note 43, at 429-47 (providing a thorough case study of
the Pernod-Ricard/Bacardi-Martini dispute).
116 Appellate Body Report, United States - § 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations
Act of 1998, 99, WT/DS176/AB/R Uan. 2, 2002).
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6 quinquies of the Paris Convention requires accepting trademarks
for registration in the same form, without eliminating member dis-
cretion to apply rules concerning other rights in marks.1 1 7 TRIPS
Articles 15 and 16 were found not to prevent individual WTO
members from making their own determination regarding the
ownership of marks within the boundaries established by the Paris
Convention.118 TRIPS Article 42 regarding procedural rights was
held not to obligate a member to permit adjudication of each sub-
stantive claim regarding trademark rights a party might assert if
that party is fairly determined ab initio not to be the holder of an in-
terest in the subject mark. 19 In sum, the Appellate Body confirmed
the right of the United States to refuse registration and enforce-
ment of trademarks it determines to have been confiscated in viola-
tion of international law.
Contrary to the WTO panel findings that certain formal legal
differences in the treatment of U.S. and foreign nationals in the
relevant U.S. legislation did not amount to a violation of the na-
tional treatment obligations of TRIPS Article 3, the Appellate Body
found that -even though the likelihood of effective discrimination
might be small -the mere possibility of additional procedural hur-
dles for non-U.S. nationals was "inherently less favorable" and
contrary to Article 3.120 Similarly, the Appellate Body found that
formally different treatment of Cuban nationals and those from
other foreign countries established a prima facie inconsistency with
the obligation of most-favored-nation treatment under TRIPS Arti-
cle 4.121 Yet, since the EC's main claim that the United States
lacked the power to deny ownership of the subject mark was not
upheld by the Appellate Body, the risk of transatlantic trade sanc-
tions in order to enforce these very strict interpretations of Articles
3 and 4-with adverse effects on EC and U.S. traders and consum-
117 See id. 147-48 (describing the scope of Article 6 quinquies and uphold-
ing the Panel).
118 See id. 156-64, 195 (considering what would constitute a violation of
the provisions of Article 15 and finding that Article 16.1 does not speak to trade-
mark ownership).
119 See id. 226 ("There is nothing in the procedural obligations of Article 42
that prevents a Member... from legislating whether or not its courts must exam-
ine each and every requirement of substantive law at issue before making a rul-
ing.") (emphasis added).
120 See id. 289, 296 (giving a sample situation in which someone might be
discriminated against, in reversing the Panel).
121 Id. 309.
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ers not involved in this dispute -was the dangerous result of trans-
forming "a fairly ordinary commercial trademark dispute between
two well-financed private enterprises into a matter of high poli-
tics."122
5.2. INTO Disputes Over Trade-Related Investment Measures May Be
Settled More Effectively Outside the WTO
The four WTO disputes discussed thus far under TRIMS, and
the increasing number of WTO disputes over the rights of private
services suppliers, foreign investors, and intellectual property
holders under GATS and TRIPS often involve disputes not only
over rights and obligations of WTO members but also private
rights and claims of injury caused by illegal government measures.
Since about one-third of world trade is intra-firm trade among sub-
sidiaries of multinational corporations, illegal trade restrictions
may at the same time result in illegal treatment of foreign inves-
tors. Most BITs provide that the legal obligations of host states to
grant most-favored-nation treatment or national treatment to for-
eign investors must be determined in light of the relevant interna-
tional law rules, which may include the WTO obligations of the
host state concerned. Even if the intergovernmental dispute is
submitted to the WTO, the private economic operators may chal-
lenge the foreign government measure through investor-state arbi-
tration pursuant to the dispute settlement procedures of Chapter
11 of NAFTA,12 3in the ECJ (e.g., by Ecuadorian and U.S. banana-
exporting companies challenging the EC import restrictions), or in
other domestic courts. Under general international and WTO law,
private recourse to domestic or regional courts and "mixed" inves-
tor-state arbitration do not preclude the host state of an investor
from initiating WTO dispute settlement proceedings. 124
Both inside and outside the WTO, such trade-related invest-
ment disputes may raise new legal and procedural questions:
To what extent can WTO dispute settlement bodies apply in-
vestment and intellectual property rules agreed upon by both par-
ties to a dispute outside the WTO framework (e.g., one under the
122 Abbott & Cottier, supra note 115, at 439.
123 See NAFTA, supra note 98, chp. 11, arts. 1115-38, (establishing arbitration
procedures for investor and states).
124 See Verhoosel, supra note 56, at 495 (arguing that investors may be able to
seek arbitration under a BIT while still seeking action by their governments).
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WIPO Copyright Treaty125 or the WIPO Performances and Phono-
grams Treaty126 concluded in December 1996, not yet formally in-
corporated into TRIPS)?
Given the traditional limitation of the applicable law in WTO
panel and appellate review procedures to WTO law and a few
principles of general international law, can the complainant invoke
the general international law rules on state responsibility in an in-
vestment dispute before a WTO panel and request reparation for
an injury suffered?
Are there certain categories of disputes which, in the interest of
both the complainant and the defending country, could be more
effectively settled by "arbitration within the WTO as an alternative
means of dispute settlement," as provided for in Article 25 of the
DSU?
127
Since WTO law does not specify arbitration procedures, could
parties to arbitration at the WTO use the Permanent Court of Arbi-
tration ("PCA") Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes Between
Two States' 28 as a basis for mutually agreed-upon arbitration at the
WTO?
Pursuant to Article 33 of the PCA arbitration rules, the "arbitral
tribunal shall apply the law chosen by the parties, or[,] in the ab-
sence of an agreement, shall decide such disputes in accordance
with international law.' 29 Could the parties to the dispute request
that the arbitral tribunal apply not only WTO law but also other
rules of international law, including a BIT accepted by both par-
ties?
If the defending country does not agree to such arbitration
"within the WTO," 130 could the complaining country unilaterally
invoke the compromisory clause contained in many BITs provid-
ing for ICJ or ICSID jurisdiction and challenge discriminatory regu-
lations of the host state not only under the nondiscrimination obli-
gations of WTO law before a WTO panel but also under the non-
125 WIPO Copyright Treaty, Apr. 12, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 1, 2186
U.N.T.S. 152.
126 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Apr. 12, 1997, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 105-17, 1, 2186 U.N.T.S. 245.
127 DSU, supra note 33, art. 25.
128 See The Secretary-General and the International Bureau, Permanent Court of
Arbitration, in PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION BASIc DOCUMENTS 41-68 (1998)
(providing the optional rules for arbitrating disputes between two states).
129 Id. at 62.
130 DSU, supra note 33, art. 25.
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discrimination requirements of the BIT before the ICJ or ICSID ar-
bitral tribunal?
Can other substantive and procedural international treaty obli-
gations, such as those under multilateral intellectual property con-
ventions administered by WIPO which often provide for jurisdic-
tion of the ICJ, be invoked parallel to WTO dispute settlement
proceedings?
Which categories of investment or intellectual property dis-
putes could, in the interest of both the private investor and the host
state, be more efficiently handled by less politicized mixed arbitra-
tion procedures between the investor and the host state in the
framework of ICSID or WIPO arbitration procedures? Under what
conditions can violations of WTO obligations mean that treatment
of adversely affected investors is not "in accordance with interna-
tional law" as required by BITs and NAFTA? 131 Does the lack of
WTO guarantees for reparation of damages influence the interpre-
tation of the relevant rules on state responsibility under BITs in the
case of WTO rules violations? What are the advantages, disadvan-
tages, and potential legal problems associated with bringing trade
and investment disputes to the WTO, ICJ, PCA, ICSID, and WIPO,
compared with domestic courts or private arbitral tribunals (e.g.,
applying the arbitration procedures of the UN Commission on In-
ternational Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") or the ICC?
As reflected in Article 19 of the DSU, 132 there is a longstanding
limitation on legal remedies under GATT and WTO law. Private
investors and holders of intellectual property rights may prefer to
submit disputes over alleged violations of their rights to dispute
settlement fora other than the WTO in order to secure legal rulings
not only on the illegality and termination of the contested govern-
ment measures but also on reparation of injury. Most BITs protect
foreign investments in a broadly defined manner, including pro-
tecting investor and intellectual property rights covered by GATS
and by TRIPS. While earlier BITs often only provided for recourse
to the ICJ or ad hoc arbitration of state-to-state disputes, modern
BITs also include provisions for investor-state arbitration pursuant
to the procedures of the ICSID, UNCITRAL, ICC, or other arbitra-
131 NAFTA, supra note 98, art. 1105, para. 1. See generally Verhoosel, supra
note 56, at 497-99 (discussing the NAFTA jurisprudence and the very restrictive
"Notes of interpretation" adopted by the NAFTA Free Trade Commission in July
2001).
132 DSU, supra note 33, art. 19.
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tion institutions. Most modern BITs offer a choice among different
arbitral regimes and no longer insist on prior exhaustion of local
remedies. Under the ICSID and some BITs, resorting to investor-
state arbitration may preclude recourse to state-to-state dispute set-
tlement for the same dispute. While investor-state arbitration may
provide for the award of monetary damages, arbitral tribunals may
lack the power to order a host state to revoke or modify an illegal
government measure.
133
GATT and WTO disputes over trade-related investment meas-
ures illustrate that discriminatory local purchase requirements, as
well as performance or licensing requirements imposed on foreign
investors in violation of the national treatment requirements of
GATT and WTO law, may also violate the national treatment re-
quirements in BITs and give rise to investor-state arbitration on
claims of injury where reparations are sought. The WTO panel re-
port on Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Indus-
try, 134 which was adopted by the WTO on July 23, 1998,135 illus-
trates some of the advantages and potential disadvantages of
investment disputes in the WTO:
a) The short time of less than one year between the compo-
sition of the Panel on July 29, 1997 and the adoption of the
lengthy panel report (some 398 pages) by the Dispute Set-
tlement Body ("DSB") on July 23, 1998 shows the relative
speed of WTO dispute settlement proceedings.
b) The WTO panel dealt with three initially different com-
plaints by Japan, the EC, and the United States Following
Article 9 of the DSU, the DSB established a single panel to
133 For more information on the dispute settlement procedures under BITs
and how they compare to WTO dispute settlement procedures, see Working
Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment, Note by the Secretariat:
Consultation and Settlement of Disputes Between Members, WT/WGTI/W/134 (Aug.
7, 2002.).
134 Panel Report, Indonesia- Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry,
WT/DS54/R (July 2, 1998) [hereinafter July 2 Panel Report]. This panel report has
remained the only case in which a violation of TRIMS was established. In the
three other WTO disputes in which claims under TRIMS were raised, the panels
declined to make a ruling on the alleged violations on grounds of "judicial econ-
omy" because the panels were not persuaded that the TRIMS provisions con-
cerned were more specific than the relevant GATT provisions examined by the
panels.
135 Id.
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examine these complaints. The Panel organized its exami-
nation and presented its findings to the DSB, pursuant Arti-
cle 9.2 of the DSU, "in such a manner that the rights which
the parties to the dispute would have enjoyed had separate
panels examined the complaints [were] in no way im-
paired."136 These multiple complainant procedures are fre-
quent in WTO dispute settlement practice and enable im-
portant synergies for all parties involved.
c) India and Korea intervened as third parties in the WTO
panel proceeding in support of Indonesia.137 Frequent prac-
tice of third party intervention in WTO dispute settlement
proceedings offers important advantages (e.g., in terms of
prevention of additional disputes among the countries in-
volved) and compares favorably with the rare recourse to
third-party intervention in practice at the ICJ.
138
d) Simultaneous to the establishment of the Panel in June
1997, the DSB agreed to the EC's request for the initiation of
an "information-gathering procedure" pursuant to Annex 5
of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures. 139 These rather unique "Procedures for Develop-
ing Information Concerning Serious Prejudice," which were
subsequently also invoked by the United States and took
place under the chairmanship of the Ambassador of Hong
Kong as "representative of the DSB," require every WTO
member to "cooperate in the development of evidence to be
examined by a panel in procedures under... Article 7."140
136 DSU, supra note 33, art. 9.2.
137 July 2 Panel Report, supra note 134, para. 1.16.
138 See, e.g., SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT, 1920-1996, 1481-555 (3rd ed. 1997) (discussing the background of interven-
tion by third parties).
139 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
The Legal Text-Results of the Uruguay Round 164 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 164.
(" [T]he DSB shall, upon request, initiate the procedure to obtain such information
from the government of the subsidizing Member as necessary to establish the ...
amount of subsidization, the value of total sales of the subsidized firms, [and] in-
formation necessary to analyze the adverse effects caused by the subsidized
product.").
140 Id. para. 1.
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The comprehensive factual information formally estab-
lished through this independent fact-finding procedure was
subsequently used in the panel proceeding. The procedure
illustrates the manifold advantages of institutionalized dis-
pute settlement proceedings inside a worldwide organiza-
tion, with special expertise and procedures beneficial for
dispute settlement proceedings.
141
e) In April 1998, all parties requested the Panel to review, in
accordance with Article 15.2 of the DSU, certain aspects of
the interim panel report that had been transmitted to the
parties in March 1998.142 The final Panel Report noted that
various factual and legal findings of the interim panel re-
port were clarified or modified so as to take into account
the comments received by all parties on the interim re-
port.143 This interim panel review procedure, pursuant to
Article 15 of the DSU, was inspired by a similar procedure
in the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement4 4 and continues
to be rather unique in international dispute settlement prac-
tice when compared to the procedures of international
courts and arbitral tribunals.
f) The Panel findings began with a number of preliminary
rulings which the Panel had adopted at its first substantive
meeting with the parties. It clarified the obligations of the
private lawyers representing Indonesia and members of its
delegation, the jurisdiction of the Panel regarding certain
loans provided under Indonesia's National Car Program,
the submission and protection of business proprietary in-
formation, and the claim by Indonesia that panel findings
were no longer necessary because the National Car Pro-
gram had been terminated.145 The preliminary rulings (e.g.,
on the right to be represented by private lawyers before a
141 See, e.g., the administrative, technical and legal advice given to WTO pan-
els by the WTO operational and legal divisions.
142 July 2 Panel Report, supra note 134, 13.1.
143 Id. 13.2.
144 Free Trade Agreement art. 1807, U.S.-Can., Jan. 2,1988, 27 I.L.M. 281.
145 July 2 Panel Report, supra note 134, 14.9.
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WTO panel) 146 illustrate that WTO dispute settlement pro-
cedures offer effective remedies to deal quickly with pre-
liminary objections in accordance with the general rules of
international law.
g) The Panel began its legal findings with a general state-
ment on the methods of treaty interpretation applied by the
Panel:
Throughout this report, we have based our analysis on
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
provisions under examination in their context and in
the light of their object and purpose. In our analysis of
the scope and purpose of these provisions[,] we have
also taken into account past GATT and WTO panel re-
ports and Appellate Body reports when we considered
them relevant and applicable in the present dispute. We
are aware, however, that they are not binding, except
with respect to resolving the particular dispute between
the parties to that dispute.
147
WTO panel and Appellate Body reports continue to differ
from most other international dispute settlement rulings by
their frequent findings on the methods of treaty interpreta-
tion (as codified in Articles 31 and 32 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties)1 48 and their emphasis
on the ordinary meaning of applicable WTO rules.
h) The Panel concluded, inter alia, that (1) the local content
requirements of Indonesia's National Car Program had vio-
lated TRIMS Article 2; (2) the sales taxes had discriminated
in favor of domestic motor vehicles in violation of GATT
Article 111:2; (3) customs duties and sales taxes had also dis-
criminated in favor of national cars imported from Korea in
violation of GATT Article I; and (4) the EC had demon-
strated that Indonesia had caused, through the use of sub-
146 Id. 14.1.
147 Id. 14 n.639.
148 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31-32, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
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sidies provided through the National Car Program, serious
prejudice to the interests of the EC within the meaning of
Article 5(c) of the Subsidies Agreement..49 A number of
other complaints, including a U.S. complaint that Indonesia
had breached its obligations under TRIPS with respect to
the acquisition and maintenance of trademark rights, were
rejected by the Panel.150 Compared with many other inter-
national dispute settlement proceedings, which tend to fo-
cus on one or two governmental measures, the Panel report
illustrates the often simultaneous examination of a large
number of government measures (here, discriminatory cus-
toms duties, taxes, purchase requirements, subsidies, acqui-
sition, and maintenance of trademarks) in WTO dispute set-
tlement proceedings. On the worldwide level, such
disputes over customs duties, taxes, purchase require-
ments, subsidies, and trademarks are hardly ever submitted
to the ICJ or to international arbitral tribunals. This is be-
cause Article 23 of the DSU requires WTO members to set-
tle their disputes under its "covered agreements."
i) Unlike most other international dispute settlement pro-
ceedings, WTO panel reports are subject to appeal pursuant
to Article 17 of the DSU. In this dispute, Indonesia did not,
however, make use of this legal remedy.
j) The detailed DSU rules for the multilateral surveillance
of the implementation of dispute settlement recommenda-
tions and rulings, as well as for compensation and suspen-
sion of concessions, are quite unique when compared to
other worldwide dispute settlement procedures. Even
though Indonesia had indicated its intention to comply
with the dispute settlement ruling by the DSB, the EC re-
quested that the "reasonable period of time" for the imple-
mentation of the dispute settlement findings be determined
by arbitration pursuant to Article 21.3 of the DSU.151 The
149 July 2 Panel Report, supra note 177, § XIV.
150 Id. 15.1.
151 Award of the Arbitrator, Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automo-
bile Industry, 12, WT/DS54/15, WT/DS55/14, WT/DS59/13, WT/DS64/12 (Dec.
7,1998) [hereinafter Indonesia Award].
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arbitrator determined that, taking into account Indonesia's
status as a developing country and its then-dire economic
and financial crisis, "the reasonable period of time for the
implementation by Indonesia of the recommendations and
rulings in this case is twelve months from the date of adop-
tion of the Panel Report by the DSB, that is twelve months
from 23 July 1998."152 In July 1999, Indonesia informed the
DSB that it had effectively implemented the prescribed rec-
ommendations and rulings.
Since the complaining countries had not requested reparation
of injury, the Panel made no findings in this respect. According to
Article 19, paragraph 1 of the DSU:
[w]here a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a
measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall
recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure
into conformity with that agreement. In addition to its rec-
ommendations, the panel or Appellate Body may suggest
ways in which the Member concerned could implement the
recommendations.
153
It remains to be clarified in future WTO legal practice whether
this text, as well as the admonition in paragraph 2 that "the panel
and Appellate Body cannot add to or diminish the rights and obli-
gations provided in the covered agreements," exclude recourse to
the general international law rules on state responsibility and repa-
ration of injury caused by violations of WTO rules.'-
5.3. Arbitration Within the WTO Could Permit Extending the
Applicable Law and Remedies by Mutual Agreement
Even though most domestic legal systems limit abusive forum
shopping as well as parallel and successive judicial proceedings
over the same legal claims among the same parties, they recognize
the legal autonomy of private parties to resolve their dispute by
way of mutually agreed-upon arbitration, subject to a few excep-
tions for non-arbitrable legal matters such as criminal law, where
national courts assert exclusive jurisdiction. Similarly, the DSU
152 Id. 25.
153 DSU, supra note 33, art. 19.1.
154 Id. art. 19.2
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provides for exclusive jurisdiction of WTO dispute settlement bod-
ies "[w]hen Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations
or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered
agreements," 15 5 without precluding mutually agreed-upon "arbi-
tration within the WTO"' 56 or unilateral recourse to international
arbitration pursuant to procedures specified in a number of other
DSU provisions,157 the WTO Agreement on Subsidies, 158 and
GATS.' 59
According to Article 25.1 of the DSU, "[e]xpeditious arbitration
within the WTO as an alternative means of dispute settlement can
facilitate the solution of certain disputes that concern issues that
are clearly defined by both parties." 160 Article 25 goes on to pro-
vide:
Except as otherwise provided in this Understanding, resort
to arbitration shall be subject to mutual agreement of the
parties which shall agree on the procedures to be followed.
Agreement to resort to arbitration shall be notified to all
Members sufficiently in advance of the actual commence-
ment of the arbitration process.
161
The DSU does not specify whether arbitration within the WTO
requires procedural links with the WTO dispute settlement system
(e.g., WTO membership of all parties to the dispute and provision
of "secretarial and technical support" by the WTO Secretariat as
per Article 27.1 of the DSU) 162 or substantive legal links (e.g., the
application of WTO law in the dispute). The text of Article 25 sug-
gests that these questions are left to the mutual agreement of the
parties, subject to review by the DSB.163 Article 3.5 of the DSU
stipulates that "arbitration awards.., shall be consistent with [the
155 Id. art. 23.1.
156 Id. art. 25.
157 Id. arts. 21.3, 22.6, 22.7, 26.1.
158 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 139,
arts. 4.11, 7.10, 8.5.
159 GATS, supra note 106, arts. 21-22. See generally Valerie Hughes, Arbitration
within the WNTO, in THE WTO DIsPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 75 (dis-
cussing the circumstances under which the DSU calls for exclusive jurisdiction of
WTO dispute settlement bodies).
160 DSU, supra note 33, art. 25.1
161 Id. art. 25.2.
162 Id. art. 27.1.
163 Id. art. 25.
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covered] agreements and shall not nullify or impair benefits accru-
ing to any Member under those agreements, nor impede the at-
tainment of any objective of those agreements." 164
There has been only a single arbitration under Article 25 to
date. In United States -Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act -
Recourse to Article 25 of the DSU, the EC and the United States re-
quested that the arbitrators determine the level of nullification or
impairment of benefits resulting from the inconsistency of Section
110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act with TRIPS Article 9, as previously
determined in a WTO panel report adopted by the DSB.165 The ar-
bitrators determined that the level of EC benefits being nullified or
impaired as a result of Section 110(5) amounted to $1,100,000 per
year.166 Following protracted negotiations and successive status
reports by the United States on its progress in implementing the
WTO dispute settlement findings, the EC and United States in-
formed the DSB in June 2003 of a mutually satisfactory temporary
arrangement for financial compensation of the EC copyright hold-
ers concerned.
If WTO members do not want to elaborate case-specific arbitra-
tion procedures, they can have recourse to optional standard arbi-
tration procedures, such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration Op-
tional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two States of 1992.167
These rules have been elaborated for use in arbitrating disputes
arising under public international law treaties and can be modified
for use in connection with multilateral treaties. They are based on
UNCITRAL arbitration rules with changes in order to:
a) reflect the public international law character of such
disputes and state practice pertaining to such treaties;
b) indicate the role of the Secretary-General and the Inter-
national Bureau of the PCA at the Hague for the ad-
ministration of such arbitration proceedings; and
164 Id. art. 3.5.
165 Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act,
WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000).
166 Award of the Arbitrator, United States -Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright
Act, WT/DS160/ARB25/1 (Nov. 9, 2001).
167 Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes Be-
tween Two States, in PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION BAsic DOCUMENTS, supra
note 128, at 41-68.
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c) provide freedom for the parties to choose to have an ar-
bitral tribunal of one, three, or five persons.
PCA publications emphasize that experience in arbitration
since 1981 suggests that UNCITRAL arbitration rules, although
originally designed for commercial arbitration, "provide fair and
effective procedures for peaceful resolution of disputes between
states concerning the interpretation, application, and performance"
of public international law treaties, 168 and also "provide fair and
effective procedures for peaceful resolution of disputes involving
international organizations and States." 169 PCA rules are optional
and emphasize party autonomy and flexibility:
a) the rules, and the services of the Secretary-General and
the International Bureau of the PCA, are available for
use by international organizations and by all states,
even to those disputes in which the states concerned are
parties to either the 1899 or 1907 Hague Convention for
the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes;
b) the choice of arbitrators is not limited to persons who
are listed as members and potential arbitrators on the
roster of the PCA;
c) parties have complete freedom to agree upon any indi-
vidual or institution (e.g. the WTO Director-General) as
"appointing authority" if the parties cannot agree on
the nomination of the arbitrators. The PCA rules pro-
vide that the PCA Secretary-General will designate an
appointing authority if the parties do not agree upon
the authority or if the authority they choose does not
act;
d) PCA "Guidelines for Adapting the Permanent Court of
Arbitration Rules to Disputes Arising under Multilat-
eral Agreements and Multiparty Contracts" suggest cer-
tain modifications concerning the optional rules for
naming arbitrators and sharing costs. 1
70
168 Id. at 45.
169 Id. at 101.
170 Guidelines for Adapting the Permanent Court of Arbitration Rules to Disputes
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Mutually agreed-upon arbitration within the WTO, pursuant to
both Article 25 of the DSU and PCA optional arbitration rules,
could offer a number of advantages, provided that both parties
agree:
a) The optional rules are flexible enough to permit agree-
ment among the parties that the arbitration be held at
the WTO premises, with the WTO Secretariat serving as
registry, providing secretariat and legal services, and
acting as a channel of communications between the par-
ties.
b) The parties could also agree on applying other DSU
rules (e.g., on the choice of arbitrators, periods of time,
hearing of experts) on a subsidiary basis to the extent
they are consistent with PCA arbitration rules.
PCA optional rules on the choice of applicable law would en-
able parties to a dispute to choose not only WTO law as applicable
but also any other treaty rule (e.g., in bilateral investment treaties
and WIPO conventions) as well as general rules of international
law (e.g., on reparation of injury caused by violation of interna-
tional law rules). A major advantage of arbitration within the
WTO could thus be the avoidance of multiple complaints inside
and outside the WTO; this could avoid the risk of mutually con-
flicting rulings if WTO panels base their findings only on WTO law
while arbitration outside the WTO does not take into account WTO
law in view of the requirement in Article 23 of the DSU to "seek
redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or im-
pairment of benefits under the covered agreements... [by] re-
course to... the rules and procedures of this Understanding." 171
Article 25.3 of the DSU not only provides for the possibility of
participation by third-party WTO members in arbitration within
the WTO but also requires that "arbitration awards shall be noti-
fied to the DSB and the Council or Committee of any relevant
agreement where any Member may raise any point relating
thereto." 172 Article 3.5 of the DSU stipulates that:
Arising under Multilateral Agreements and Multiparty Contracts, in PERMANENT
COURT OF ARBITRATION BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 128, at 217-20.
171 DSU, supra note 33, art. 23.
172 Id. art. 25.3.
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[Aill solutions to matters formally raised under the consul-
tation and dispute settlement provisions of the covered
agreements, including arbitration awards, shall be consis-
tent with those agreements and shall not nullify or impair
benefits accruing to any Member under those agreements,
nor impede the attainment of any objective of those agree-
ments.
173
The discussion of arbitration awards in the DSB would not af-
fect their legally binding effect among the parties to the dispute but
could prove beneficial for clarifying interface problems between
WTO law and the other fields of international law.
According to Article 25.4 of the DSU, "Articles 21 and 22 of this
Understanding shall apply mutatis mutandis to arbitration
awards." 174 Arbitration within the WTO therefore offers another
advantage over arbitration outside the WTO, such as the availabil-
ity of DSU rules for multilateral surveillance of implementation of
dispute settlement rulings, compensation, and suspension of con-
cessions as "temporary measures available in the event that the
recommendations and rulings are not implemented within a rea-
sonable period of time." 175 Article 23 of the DSU on "Strengthen-
ing of the Multilateral System," notably the prohibition of unilat-
eral determinations of violations of WTO rules and the
requirement to respect WTO dispute settlement procedures and
rulings, likewise applies to "an arbitration award rendered under
this Understanding."
1 76
Compared with DSU rules, PCA optional arbitration rules offer
additional provisions, including interpretation and correction of
awards, additional awards as to claims presented in the arbitral
proceedings but omitted from the award, and determination and
apportionment of the costs of arbitration in the award.
This short survey suggests that, for certain categories of dis-
putes, the possibility of "[e]xpeditious arbitration within the WTO
as an alternative means of dispute settlement" could be more ad-
vantageous in terms of dispute settlement procedures, 177 applicable
substantive international law, and available legal remedies than
173 Id. art. 3.5.
174 Id. art. 25.4.
175 Id. art. 22.1.
176 Id. art. 23.2.
177 DSU, supra note 33, art. 25.
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normal WTO panel and appellate review procedures.
5.4. Simultaneous or Successive Recourse to WTO Dispute Settlement
Procedures and the ICJ
As many WTO members have accepted the jurisdiction of the
ICJ pursuant to Article 36 of the ICJ Statute, an intergovernmental
dispute in the WTO may be linked to related legal claims and dis-
pute settlement proceedings in the ICJ. For instance, in the mari-
time delimitation dispute between Nicaragua, Colombia, and
Honduras, Nicaragua submitted its maritime dispute with Hondu-
ras to the ICJ in December 1999. Colombia requested WTO consul-
tations with Nicaragua in January 2000178 and the establishment of
a WTO panel in May 2000179 to examine whether Nicaragua's trade
sanctions in response to the maritime dispute were inconsistent
with its GATT obligations. Honduras requested WTO consulta-
tions over the alleged inconsistencies of Nicaragua's countermea-
sures with GATT and GATS in June 2000 and reserved its third-
party rights to intervene in the WTO panel proceeding between
Nicaragua and Colombia.18 0  In such parallel dispute settlement
proceedings in the WTO and in the ICJ, the legal findings of one
forum (e.g., on the legal justifiability of trade restrictions under the
general international law rules on state responsibility and coun-
termeasures) may be influenced by the legal findings in the other
forum (e.g., on the violation of Nicaragua's rights under the law of
the sea).
Concurrent trade-related investment disputes at the WTO and
ICJ appear unlikely for a number of reasons. In contrast to the in-
creasing number of international investment disputes under ICSID
and NAFTA dispute settlement rules, states remain very reluctant
to submit international investment disputes to the ICJ and the clas-
sical international law rules on the treatment of aliens and the pro-
tection of foreign-owned property. Similar to the few investment
disputes submitted to the PCIJ- the 1926 and 1928 judgments of
178 Request for Consultations by Colombia, Nicaragua - Measures Affecting Im-
ports from Honduras and Colombia, WT/DS188/1 (Jan. 20, 2000).
179 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Colombia, Nicaragua -
Measures Affecting Imports from Honduras and Colombia, WT/DS188/2 (Mar. 28,
2000). This panel was not composed.
180 Request for Consultations by Honduras, Nicaragua -Measures Affecting
Imports from Honduras and Colombia, WT/DS201/1 (June 13, 2000).
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the PCIJ in the Chorzow Factory case,181 the 1925 and 1927 judg-
ments in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concession cases,182 the 1934
judgment in the Oscar Chinn case -the 1970 judgment by the ICJ in
the Barcelona Traction case183 and its 1989 judgment in the ELSI
caseI84 are illustrative of the fact that the ICJ seems to be perceived
by most foreign investors and their home governments as a sub-
optimal legal framework for the settlement of modern investment
disputes.
185
Even though many WTO members have accepted the jurisdic-
tion of the ICJ under multilateral WIPO conventions on the protec-
tion of intellectual property rights, no intellectual property dispute
has ever been submitted to the ICJ to date. Yet some of the more
than twenty dispute settlement proceedings under TRIPS 186 in-
volved legal claims based, for example, on the Paris Convention on
Industrial Property 87 and the Bern Convention for the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works,188 each of which could have also
been submitted to the ICJ pursuant to the dispute settlement provi-
sions in these WIPO conventions.
Several other international agreements providing for the dis-
pute settlement jurisdiction of the ICJ, such as Articles 84 and 86 of
the 1944/1968 Convention on International Civil Aviation, 8 9 could
181 Chorzow Factory (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (July 26).
182 Mavrommatis Palestine Concession (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 2, at 11-12 (Aug. 30) (noting the rule of exhaustion of local remedies as re-
quired by the case's holding).
183 See The Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company, Limited, 1970
I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5).
184 See Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20) [ELSI].
185 See supra text accompanying notes 82-83; MUTHUCUMARASWAMY
SORNARAJAH, THE SETTLEMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 340 (2000). On the
decreasing role of the ICJ for the settlement of international economic disputes,
see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Dispute Settlement in International Economic Law -
Lessons for Strengthening International Dispute Settlement in Non-Economic Areas, 2 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 189, 202-04 (1999).
186 See Frederick M. Abbott, IWTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to the
Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, in THE WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 421 (analyzing TRIPS disputes); Mitsuo Mat-
sushita, Appellate Body Jurisprudence on the GATS and the TRIPS Agreement, in THE
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 421 (analyzing the TRIPS ju-
risprudence of the Appellate Body).
187 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883,
21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (last revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967).
188 Bern Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (amended Oct. 2, 1979).
189 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, arts. 84, 86, 61
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also be relevant for related dispute settlement proceedings in the
WTO (e.g., on international air transport services). WTO law in-
cludes few provisions dealing explicitly with such jurisdictional
overlaps. For instance, section 2 of the GATS Annex on Air Trans-
port Services provides that "[t]he Agreement, including its dispute
settlement procedures, shall not apply to measures affecting (a)
traffic rights, however granted; or (b) services directly related to
the exercise of traffic rights." 190 A different kind of regulation of
jurisdictional problems is to be found in section 4, which provides
that, "[t]he dispute settlement procedures of the Agreement may
be invoked only where obligations or specific commitments have
been assumed by the concerned Members and where dispute set-
tlement procedures in bilateral and other multilateral agreements
or arrangements have been exhausted."191 Article 22.3 of GATS of-
fers an example for the possibility of international arbitration in the
case of competing jurisdictions for consultations (Article 22) and
dispute settlement (Article 23):
A Member may not invoke Article 27, either under this Ar-
ticle or Article 23, with respect to a measure of another
Member that falls within the scope of an international
agreement between them relating to the avoidance of dou-
ble taxation. In case of disagreement between Members as
to whether a measure falls within the scope of such an
agreement between them, it shall be open to either Member
to bring this matter before the Council for Trade in Services.
The Council shall refer the matter to arbitration. The deci-
sion of the arbitrator shall be final and binding on the Mem-
bers.1
92
If disputes outside the WTO (e.g., at the ICJ) also involve rights
and obligations under WTO law, Article 23.1 of the DSU requires
WTO members to "seek the redress of a violation of obligations or
other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered
agreements... [by] recourse to... the rules and procedures of this
Understanding." 193 WTO law does not prevent the submission of
Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
190 GATS, supra note 106, at Annex on Air Transport Services §2.
191 Id. at Annex on Air Transport Services §4.
192 GATS, supra note 106, art. 22.3.
193 DSU, supra note 33, art. 23.1.
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disputes over related obligations under other international treaties
to the ICJ. If the dispute before the WTO dispute settlement bodies
is limited to WTO law and the dispute before the ICJ is related to
other international treaty rights and obligations, the simultaneous
examination of all treaty obligations in order to reach a compre-
hensive settlement of the dispute may be in the interest of both
parties. Should there be objections by the defending country to ar-
bitration within the WTO on all of these treaty rights and obliga-
tions, the complaining country may unilaterally submit the WTO
dispute to WTO panel proceedings and initiate ICJ proceedings for
the protection of its other international treaty rights.
Neither the DSU194 nor general international law rules (e.g., on
litis pendens) seem to stand in the way of such simultaneous or suc-
cessive WTO and ICJ dispute settlement proceedings on different,
yet related, legal claims. In order to avoid incoherent dispute set-
tlement findings, some coordination among concurrent and related
dispute settlement proceedings in different fora is desirable. While
WTO panel and Appellate Body reports have repeatedly referred
to the jurisprudence of the ICJ, no ICJ judgment has so far referred
to WTO law or jurisprudence. The differences in procedures for
the settlement of disputes at the ICJ and the WTO might hinder
such practical coordination. For example, the procedural require-
ment of prior exhaustion of local remedies-which was empha-
sized by the ICJ in its ELSI judgment-has never been applied in
GATT and WTO dispute settlement practice. 195 In contrast to ICJ
procedures, WTO dispute settlement procedures tend to be much
quicker, are not limited to sovereign states, favor third-party inter-
vention, and permit amicus curiae briefs. If, as in the case of many
BITs, an international investment treaty provides for jurisdiction of
an arbitral tribunal over the ICJ, some of these procedural differ-
ences and potential problems could be avoided by mutual agree-
ment among the parties to the dispute-for instance, on the com-
position of the WTO panel and arbitral tribunal by the same
arbitrators and the application of coherent dispute settlement pro-
cedures.
5.5. Simultaneous or Successive Recourse to WTO, ICSID, or IPO
194 See, e.g., id. at art. 23.1 et. seq. (establishing WTO dispute resolution mecha-
nisms as the only mechanisms by which disputes related to WTO law can be re-
solved).
195 Cf. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, supra note 10, at 240-44.
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Dispute Settlement Procedures
Instead of requesting that its home state espouse and defend its
legal claims by means of intergovernmental dispute settlement
proceedings at the WTO, the ICJ, or under intergovernmental arbi-
tration procedures, a foreign private investor, a service supplier
protected under GATS, or an intellectual property holder protected
under TRIPS might prefer to de-politicize and control its dispute
with a foreign government-for example, so as to avoid adverse
effects of intergovernmental dispute settlement proceedings on its
future business in the host country. If, as in the case of many BITs,
the investment agreement provides for either intergovernmental
arbitration or mixed investor-state arbitration pursuant to ICSID
arbitration procedures, the private complainant may directly in-
voke the ICSID clause in the BIT and submit its investment dispute
to investor-state arbitration pursuant to ICSID procedures. ICSID
arbitration proceedings offer various advantages when compared
with intergovernmental arbitration, adjudication, or WTO panel
proceedings.
ICSID conciliation (e.g., on the use of revision clauses in in-
vestment contracts) or arbitration procedures between the host
state and the foreign investor can be kept confidential. 19 6 By avoid-
ing the politicization frequent in intergovernmental disputes,
ICSID procedures may increase the prospects for a mutually
agreed-upon solution that safeguards the continued future opera-
tion of investments and the long-term interests of both parties.
197
The majority of the conciliation and arbitration cases registered by
ICSID tend to conclude with settlements by the parties on agreed-
upon terms before the rendering of an award.
The jurisdiction of the ICSID over "any legal dispute arising di-
rectly out of an investment" 198 is broad since the definition of the
covered "investment disputes" is left to agreement among the par-
196 The ICSID Secretariat is a neutral body that assists in the administration of
conciliation and arbitration proceedings but does not itself engage in actual con-
ciliation or arbitration.
197 Cf. L. Michael Hager & Robert Pritchard, Deal Mediation: How ADR Tech-
niques Can Help Achieve Durable Agreements in the Global Markets, 14 ICSID REV. 1,
2-4 (1999) (arguing that ADR which takes the form of "deal mediation" "can be
used to build the collaborative relationships which yield durable agreements in
international commerce" and giving examples of deals which went forward
thanks to the application of ADR).
198 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, supra note 88, art. 25.1.
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ties. The "Additional Facility Rules" of 1978 authorize the ICSID
Secretariat to administer conciliation and arbitration proceedings
between states and nationals of other states which fall outside the
scope of the ICSID Convention if one of the parties is not an ICSID
Member State (or a national of an ICSID contracting state) or if the
dispute does not arise directly out of an investment, provided it is
not an ordinary commercial dispute.
Prior exhaustion of local remedies may not be necessary for
ICSID arbitration.199 ICSID arbitration may therefore lead to much
quicker international judgments when compared with investment
disputes before the ICJ that, as in the ELSI case, might be admissi-
ble only after exhaustion of local remedies that may take many
years of court proceedings in the host country.
In the absence of agreement to the contrary, an ICSID tribunal
"shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute
(including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of inter-
national law as may be applicable." 200 Therefore, international law
may not only be invoked to fill lacunae in the applicable host state's
law but also prevails in case of conflicts with the national law of
the host state. Taking into account the applicable municipal law as
well might avoid legal discrepancies, such as those that appeared
in the ICJ's ELSI judgment where the requisitioning of a foreign in-
vestment in clear violation of domestic law was held lawful under
a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation ("FCN") de-
signed to protect foreign investors.
20 1
ICSID awards "shall be binding on the parties and shall not be
subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided
for in this Convention."20 2 Unlike private commercial arbitration,
which tends to be subject to control and annulment by national
courts in the case of grave irregularities, ICSID arbitration is self-
contained in the sense that annulment procedures and other legal
remedies against ICSID judgments are reduced to the mechanisms
offered by the ICSID Convention itself.203 Moreover, "[e]ach Con-
199 See id. art. 26 (providing that states may waive the general international
law requirement of prior exhaustion of local remedies in order to consent to ICSID
arbitration).
200 See id. art. 42.1.
201 See Mann, supra note 82, at 100 (offering a criticism of the ELSI judgment
on this point).
202 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, supra note 88, art. 53.1.
203 See generally Aron Broches, On the Finality of Awards: A Reply to Michael
20061
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tracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this
Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations im-
posed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judg-
ment of a court in that State." 20 4 However, "[n]othing in Article 54
shall be construed as derogating from the law in force in any Con-
tracting State relating to immunity of that State or of any foreign
State from execution."
20 5
Even though several of the more than twenty multilateral trea-
ties on intellectual property administered by WIPO provide for set-
tlement of disputes by the ICJ, no intellectual property dispute has
been submitted to the ICJ. The 1995 WIPO Draft Treaty on the Set-
tlement of Disputes among States in the Field of Intellectual Prop-
erty20 6 likewise continues to be opposed by the United States and
other developed countries. The WIPO Arbitration and Mediation
Center was established in 1994 in response to a perceived need for
specially designed intellectual property dispute resolution proce-
dures based upon mediation, arbitration, or expedited arbitration
rules open to all persons regardless of nationality, residence, or
other links to WIPO Member States.20 7 In addition:
A state entity may be party to a dispute submitted to a pro-
cedure administered by the Center, provided that the State
entity has, like any other party to a dispute that is referred
to the Center, validly expressed its consent in writing to the
Reisman, 8 ICSID REV. 92, 96 (1993) (noting criticism of the expansive reasoning
used in some cases, notably Kl6ckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH v. Cameroon and
Amco Asia Corp. v. Indonesia to annul ICSID tribunal decisions). Broches notes that
after Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Guinea, the earlier trend of asserting a
quasi appellate review has been reversed.
204 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, supra note 88, art. 54.1.
205 Id. art. 55.
206 World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], Proposed Treaty on the
Settlement of Disputes Between States, SD/CE/VII/2 (Feb. 10, 1995).
207 See Francis Gurry, The Dispute Resolution Services of the World Intellectual
Property Organization, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 385, 385 (1999) (noting that the WIPO Ar-
bitration and Mediation Center "commenced operations in October 1994"). See
generally WIPO EXPEDITED ARBITRATION RULES: RECOMMENDED CONTRACT CLAUSES
AND SUBMISSION AGREEMENTS 5-72 (1994) (providing rules employed by the WIPO
Arbitration and Mediation Center in mediations, arbitrations, and expedited arbi-
trations). For additional information, including WIPO arbitration and mediation
rules, see generally http://arbiter.wipo.int/center/index.html (last visited April
8, 2006).
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reference of the dispute to such a procedure.2 °8
Since 2000, the newly developed WIPO electronic dispute reso-
lution system for disputes over internet domain names20 9 has led to
several thousand dispute settlement rulings about abusive registra-
tion of domain names on the Internet. The infrequent recourse to
WIPO mediation and arbitration rules210 can be attributed to the
fact that, although the rules are said to accommodate the specific
characteristics of intellectual property disputes (e.g., need for ex-
pert opinions, qualified arbitrators, admission of site visits, and
experiments) and offer many advantages (including savings of
time and cost, as well as party autonomy to choose the language
and applicable law used), most private disputes over intellectual
property rights continue to be settled in national courts or through
commercial arbitration based on UNCITRAL or ICC rules that dif-
fer little from WIPO arbitration rules.211 Since many national legal
systems remain reluctant vis-a-vis the submission of intellectual
property disputes to arbitration, there also continues to be uncer-
tainty amongst practitioners regarding the arbitrability of intellec-
tual property disputes and the recognition and enforcement of
such arbitral awards.
212
Mixed mediation or arbitration procedures between private
and governmental entities in WIPO could offer similar advantages
to ICSID procedures as compared to the more politicized WTO
dispute settlement mechanisms. Yet that there are already more
208 World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], THE SERVICES OF THE
WIPO ARBITRATION CENTER 18 (1995). In mediation and arbitration, state entities
may also act as claimant and respondent. Cf. FREDERICK ABBOTT ET AL., THE
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS,
PART Two 1734-38 (1999) (defining mediation, arbitration, and expedited arbitra-
tion, as well as describing the procedure for arbitration).
209 See Gurry, supra note 207, at 396-98 (indicating that an online system for
resolving disputes over domain names was under development and laying out
concerns with regard to online dispute resolution generally).
210 See, e.g., the case reported in Activities of the WIPO Arbitration and Me-
diation Centre, December 1999. The dispute settlement has remained confiden-
tial.
211 See generally HANS VAN HouTTE, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 384 n.6
(1995) (noting countries which have adopted or been inspired by the United Na-
tions Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") model).
212 See Jacques Werner, Intellectual Property Disputes and Arbitration: A Com-
ment on a Recent ICC Report, 1 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 841, 842 (1998) (indicating
that, because intellectual property rights are state-granted, there is some debate as
to "whether a private arbitrator could decide that a right granted by a State au-
thority is null and void, and if so, whether his decision would bind the state .. ").
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than twenty WTO dispute settlement procedures under TRIPS sug-
gests that multinational firms and other private entities favor peti-
tioning their home government to initiate complaints over non-
compliance with TRIPS obligations at the WTO. EC and U.S. trade
legislation provides explicitly for such private remedies in re-
sponse to other countries' noncompliance with TRIPS obligations.
In addition, WTO member governments seem to prefer the com-
pulsory jurisdiction and effective procedures of the WTO dispute
settlement system rather than mixed or intergovernmental dispute
settlement procedures through WIPO.
This current attitude could, however, change if the increasing
number of intellectual property disputes in the WTO begin to have
problems (perhaps because of limits on the scope of WTO law, on
the legal remedies available, or on secretarial resources within the
WTO) or if the commercial interests of private complainants in pre-
serving ongoing business relationships prompts a preference for
more discreet mixed dispute settlement procedures. Despite its
limited case docket, the WIPO Arbitration Center seems to be in-
novating and influencing the procedures for the settlement of cer-
tain categories of intellectual property disputes.213 The increasing
recourse to ICSID dispute settlement procedures suggests that
there might develop a similar demand for mixed arbitration or
mediation of intellectual property disputes with governmental au-
thorities where both parties prefer a speedy and confidential ad
hoc solution of their dispute. The arguments in favor of decentral-
izing international investment disputes also hold for intellectual
property disputes.
5.6. Inconsistencies Between International and Domestic Judicial
Review of Contingent Protection Measures
Numerous WTO agreements include guarantees of private ac-
cess to domestic courts. Article 13 of the Anti-Dumping Agree-
ment, for example, requires members to "maintain judicial, arbitral
or administrative tribunals [which can provide] ... prompt [and
independent] review of administrative actions relating to final de-
terminations and reviews of determinations .... ,,214 In the United
213 See, e.g., Gurry, supra note 207, at 396-98 (describing a new Internet-based
system of dispute resolution established by the WIPO Arbitration Center).
214 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. 13, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, The Legal Texts-Results of the Uru-
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States, parties that are involved in a final determination or in the
final results of a review may have recourse to independent tribu-
nals to challenge a determination by the U.S. Department of Com-
merce or the U.S. International Trade Commission. 215 Specifically,
parties may challenge the final agency determination before the
U.S. Court of International Trade, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, or the U.S. Supreme Court. Alternatively, in cer-
tain cases involving merchandise from Canada or Mexico, parties
have the option of appearing before a dispute panel established
under Chapter 19 of NAFTA.
216
Parallel or successive dispute settlement challenges of import
restrictions, anti-dumping determinations, or countervailing duty
determinations -e.g., in WTO dispute settlement proceedings, in
regional courts (e.g., the ECJ), or in NAFTA panels and domestic
courts-have become frequent in international trade relations. Yet
among all the WTO agreements, only the Agreement on Govern-
ment Procurement explicitly requires domestic courts to apply,
and examine violations of, relevant WTO rules.217 Because legisla-
tion in the EU and the United States on domestic implementation
of WTO law limits the direct application of WTO rules in domestic
courts,218 many domestic court decisions ignore WTO rules and
dispute settlement rulings, just as WTO dispute settlement rulings
are sometimes inconsistent with domestic court decisions (e.g.,
guay Round, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201 [Not reproduced in I.L.M.].
215 See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (2003) (allowing certain parties to appeal deci-
sions regarding duties on imports to the U.S. Court of International Trade).
216 See NAFTA, supra note 98, chp. 19, art. 1904 (providing for judicial review
of final antidumping and countervailing duty determinations by NAFTA panels).
217 See generally Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 107, art.
20.2-.8 (establishing standards for adjudicating complaints regarding the Agree-
ment).
218 See David W. Leebron, Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results in the
United States, in IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS, supra note 16, at
212 (describing the process by which the Uruguay Round agreements are given
effect in U.S. law and stating that "the Uruguay Round Agreements themselves
are unlikely to be directly applied in any proceeding other than a proceeding
brought by the United States for the purpose of enforcing obligations under the
agreements"); Petersmann, supra note 8, at 18-23 (providing an overview of the
process by which EU law gained efficacy in domestic courts and suggesting im-
plications EU and WTO law have for efforts to alter the UN charter); cf Meinhard
Hilf, Negotiating and Implementing the Uruguay Round: The Role of EC Member
States-The Case of Germany, in IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS,
supra note 16, at 134 ("[T]he European Court has ruled that at least GATF law
shall not be considered as being directly applicable in the legal order of the EC.").
2006]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
those on dumping or injury caused by dumped imports). Such in-
coherence between domestic, regional, and WTO jurisprudence
undermines legal security and the legitimacy of courts while in-
creasing international transaction costs. 219 For example, the more
than ten GATT and WTO panel, appellate, and arbitration reports
delivered since 1993 on the inconsistency between the EC's import
restrictions on bananas under GATT and GATS were preceded,
paralleled, or followed by more than forty-five EC Court judg-
ments that tended to ignore the violations of relevant GATT and
WTO rules, as well as WTO dispute settlement rulings against the
EC. 220 At the national level in Germany, adversely affected banana
importers challenged the EC's illegal import tariffs on bananas in
the tax courts, the illegal import quotas and refusals of import li-
censes for bananas in administrative courts, and illegal restrictions
of individual freedom of trade in violation of GATT, WTO, and EC
law before the German Constitutional Court.
Even though these national, regional, and worldwide dispute
settlement findings were directed against the same EC import re-
strictions, only a few national courts in Germany took into account
the relevant GATT and WTO dispute settlement findings in refus-
ing to apply the EC import restrictions given their legal inconsis-
tency with WTO law.22' The EC Court persistently ignored GATT
and WTO dispute settlement findings, as well as the EC Treaty ob-
ligations to construe and apply EC law in conformity with interna-
tional law, in the more than forty-five proceedings before the ECJ
against the EC import restrictions on bananas.222 Since most do-
219 See SHANY, supra note 31, at 54-56 (providing examples of mutually incon-
sistent NAFTA, GATT, and WTO dispute settlement findings concerning the same
trade measures, as well as discussing frequent submission of trade disputes
among NAFTA members to multiple bodies concurrently).
220 See Petersmann & Pollack, in TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC DISPUTES, supra
note 43, at 121-39 (detailing overviews and analyses of these GATT, WTO, and EC
disputes); see also JOSE CHRISTIAN CASCANTE & GERALD G. SANDER, DER STREIT UM
DIE EG-BANANENMARKTORDNUNG 110 (1999) (arguing that the ECJ erred when it
decided in a case involving an EC member as a party that conflicts between GATT
and EC rules regarding banana importation were irrelevant).
221 On the legal primacy of WTO law over EC regulations, see Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, Darf die EG das Volkerrecht ignorieren?, [1997] EUR. J. Bus. L. 325, 325-
31.
222 See PIERRE PESCATORE, LA PLACE DE L'EUROPE DANS LE COMMERCE MONDIAL
445, 458 (1994) (offering a criticism of the frequent "judicial protectionism" by the
ECJ and its often introverted neglect of international law); see also Case C-53/96,
Hermes Int'l v. FHT Mktg. Choice BV, 1998 E.C.R. 1-3603, art. 30 (1997) (finding
that "[i]t should ... be possible in future [sic] for individuals to invoke compliance
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mestic legal systems require judges to construe domestic law in
conformity with international law, many international disputes
could be avoided if domestic judges would take more seriously
their obligation to defend the rule of law and protect domestic citi-
zens against protectionist violations of international guarantees of
freedom and non-discrimination-such as those in WTO law.
6. How SHOULD LEGAL CONSISTENCY BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL
AND DOMESTIC DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEEDINGS BE PROMOTED?
THE NEED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
DISPUTES ACCORDING TO THEIR UNDERLYING CONFLICTS OF
INTERESTS
A government's reaction to a complaint by another govern-
ment or a private complainant depends on an examination of the
conflicts of interests and the relevant rules and procedures in-
volved. Optimal dispute prevention and settlement strategies
must target the source of conflicts of interests.223 Five different
categories of international trade disputes can be distinguished ac-
cording to their underlying conflicts of public and private interests;
the optimal dispute prevention and settlement rules and proce-
dures are likely to differ for each major category of international
trade dispute.224 The successful recourse to mediation and concilia-
tion in recent WTO practice raises the question of whether ADR
should not be institutionalized more effectively in the WTO context
for certain kinds of primarily political disputes. 225 The ongoing le-
galization and judicialization of international trade relations calls
for stronger horizontal and vertical judicial networks. This will
render international and domestic dispute settlement proceedings
more legally coherent, strengthen rule of law, and encourage the
prevention or settlement of international disputes at the optimal
national and international levels.
226
with the appropriate provisions of the WTO agreements ... before the courts"); cf
EC Treaty art. 300 (establishing requirements for a binding agreement between
the Community and its Members).
223 See infra Section 6.1.
224 See infra Section 6.2.
225 See infra Section 6.3.
226 See infra Section 6.4.
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6.1. Optimal Dispute Prevention and Dispute Settlement Strategies
Must Target the Source of Conflicts of Interests
International economic relations and international economic
law evolve through autonomous decisions made by private and
public economic operators (e.g., investors, producers, traders, con-
sumers, and government procurement agencies) and through
multi-level governance by transnational corporations, local and na-
tional governments, regional organizations (e.g., the EC), and
worldwide institutions (e.g., the WTO). International economic
disputes reflect conflicts among these diverse private and public,
national and international, interests. Just as negotiations and rule-
making at the international level are preceded, influenced, and fol-
lowed by domestic negotiations between government representa-
tives, parliamentarians, and domestic constituencies, so must
international dispute settlement procedures promote prevention
and settlement of disputes directly at the source of the conflicts of
interests at the national, regional, or worldwide level of decision-
making. Hence, rules and procedures for the prevention and set-
tlement of international trade disputes are needed in national laws
at the level of international relations among states, in transgov-
ernmental relations among government agencies (e.g., in interna-
tional cooperation among competition authorities), in transnational
relations among private economic actors (e.g., in private commer-
cial arbitration), and in mixed relations among private and foreign
public actors (e.g., in investor-state arbitration pursuant to ICSID
procedures). The more legitimate and coherent these national, in-
ternational, and transnational dispute prevention and settlement
rules are, the more effective they are likely to be.
6.1.1. Many international trade disputes involve conflicts among
private interests rather than among state interests
The classic international law paradigm of a dispute among
states over conflicting national interests (e.g., in the determination
of a territorial boundary) is misleading for many international
trade and investment disputes involving the interests of private
economic operators. Most international trade disputes have their
origin in domestic conflicts of interests inside states, notably in
conflicts among self-interested producers who are seeking protec-
tionist measures to assist in their competition with imports and
among the liberal trade interests of consumers and exporters. All
WTO members have committed themselves to the legal and judi-
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cial protection of long-term citizen interests in reciprocal trade lib-
eralization, non-discriminatory conditions of competition, and the
rule of law, although all of these are subject to comprehensive
safeguard clauses and public interest exceptions permitting restric-
tions of trade if, for instance, imports "cause or threaten serious in-
jury to domestic producers" 227 or if import restrictions are neces-
sary for the protection of non-economic public interests.228  In
constitutional democracies, private conflicts of interests among
producers, traders, and consumers should be decided by domestic
courts in accordance with the applicable national and international
rules ratified by domestic parliaments, while being mindful of
WTO law.
6.1.2. Choosing between dispute prevention and settlement
The distinction between prevention and settlement of a dispute
is fluid and depends on the perception of the parties involved.
Many foreign policy conflicts (e.g., those over EC import restric-
tions on genetically modified organisms) were, for several years,
deliberately left legally unsettled in the hope of reaching a negoti-
ated solution. For example, in the GATT/WTO dispute over the
EC import prohibitions on hormone-fed beef, the United States did
not insist on establishment of a dispute settlement panel until it
succeeded in replacing the 1979 Tokyo Round Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade with the more stringent rules (e.g.,
those on science-based risk assessment procedures) in the WTO
Agreement on Phytosanitary Standards. 229 By first renegotiating
the relevant substantive rules, the United States ensured the suc-
cess of its subsequent WTO complaint.230 The Doha Ministerial
Declaration on Access to Medicines of November 2001 and the
227 GATT, supra note 29, art. 19.1(a).
228 Id. arts. 20-21 (allowing protectionist measures for a variety of purposes,
including the protection of "public morals" and national security).
229 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1A, The Legal Texts-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)
[hereinafter Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards].
230 See Panel Report, European Communities -Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones), United States, 9.1, WT/DS26/R (Jun. 30, 1997) (declar-
ing the EC to have violated the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures); see also Appellate Body Report, European Communities -
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16,
1998) (upholding in part the Panel Report).
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subsequent WTO waiver granted from Article 31(f) of TRIPS in
August 2003 are further illustrations of successful dispute preven-
tion through negotiation and clarification of WTO rules in a man-
ner rendering WTO dispute settlement proceedings challenging
compulsory licenses, parallel imports of low-priced medicines, or
importation of generic drugs more unlikely. 231 A few months prior
to the Doha Ministerial Declaration, Brazil and the United States
had negotiated a mutually satisfactory solution that enabled the
suspension of the WTO panel proceeding on the U.S. complaint
that the "local working" requirement and threat of compulsory li-
censes in Brazil's patent legislation amounted to a violation of
GATT Article III and TRIPS Articles 27 and 28.232
6.1.3. Choosing among different negotiation strategies
Governments, like private negotiators, have to choose between
power-oriented negotiations (with explicit or implicit reference to
their relative power and bargaining chips) and rule-oriented nego-
tiations or adjudication aimed at enforcement of rules that were
previously agreed upon by both parties. 233 Negotiation theories2M
distinguish between three different kinds of negotiation strategies:
1. soft bargaining over positions in which a negotiator
wants to avoid personal conflict with the other side and
makes concessions readily in order to reach agreement
and an amicable resolution;
2. hard bargaining over positions over which a negotiator
231 Cf. Symposium, Health and the lNTO, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 821, 822 (2002) (dis-
cussing "[t]he place of health in international trade law").
232 See Panel Report, Brazil -Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WT/DS199
(Jan. 8, 2001) (providing details regarding the preliminary case).
233 See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 109 (1997) (distinguishing between rule-
oriented and power-oriented negotiation methods); see also Ernst-Ulrich Peters-
mann, supra note 10, at 66-70.
234 See FISHER & URY, supra note 9, at 13 (providing a table depicting negotiation
strategies appropriate to various negotiating situations); see also ROGER FISHER ET AL.,
BEYOND MACHIAVELLI: TOOLS FOR COPING WITH CONFLICT 142-44 (1994) (suggesting
the use of appropriate negotiating strategies necessary to deal productively with
conflict, which is unavoidable); ROGER FISHER & ScoTr BROWN, GETTING TOGETHER:
BUILDING A RELATIONSHIP THAT GETS TO YES 3-15 (1988) (describing the groundwork
which must obtain for dispute resolution efforts to be successful); JOHAN
KAUFMANN, CONFERENCE DIPLOMACY: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 23-25 (1968) (de-
fining and discussing negotiation methods applied at international conferences).
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sees the divergent positions as a contest of wills and
wants to win by taking extreme positions and holding
out longer;
3. principled negotiations in which a negotiator looks for
mutual gains and a "wise agreement" by separating the
personal relationship from the substantive problem, fo-
cusing on interests (rather than positions), inventing op-
tions for mutual gain, and insisting that the agreement
reflect some fair standard independent of the naked will
of either side. Positional bargaining may not only be
power-oriented and damage the personal relationship
between parties but may also lead to unwise agree-
ments with high implementation costs. By separating
people from the problem, principled negotiations help
to maintain a mutually beneficial relationship among
parties, to base the substantive agreement on objective
principles that reflect the agreed-upon long-term inter-
ests of all parties, and to serve as fair standards for set-
tling disputes over conflicts among their short-term in-
terests.
The appropriate legal strategy may depend not only on the
governmental determination of the public interest but also on the
private interests and factual, legal, and financial inputs from pri-
vate actors involved in the economic dispute. The interests may go
beyond an individual dispute to secure a package deal resolving a
number of different disputes or may reflect systemic interests in
judicial clarification of controversial rules in order to prevent fu-
ture disputes. In constitutional democracies, governments are re-
quired to promote the public interest, as defined by the constitu-
tional rights of their citizens, by enacting democratic legislation,
protecting general consumer welfare, guaranteeing consumer-
driven competition and non-discriminatory regulation of market
failures, and by preventing governmental failures.
6.2. Five Different Categories of International Trade Disputes
The habits of lawyers when distinguishing GATT disputes
from GATS, TRIPS, ICJ, ICSID, WIPO, EC, and other international
economic disputes (e.g., in regional courts and private arbitration)
are due to the fact that the relevant procedures and substantive
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rules for the prevention or settlement of a dispute differ depending
on the applicable law. The legal expertise required for the proper
conduct and evaluation of disputes in these diverse areas of inter-
national economic law also differs considerably. No single interna-
tional lawyer can follow the vast jurisprudence and legal practice
in all these areas. Legal experts specialized in ICJ, ICSID, or WIPO
dispute settlement proceedings tend to be different from those spe-
cialized in WTO, NAFTA or EC disputes. In most developed and
less-developed countries, governments involved in dispute settle-
ment proceedings can no longer rely exclusively on the in-house
legal services within their national ministries of justice, economic
affairs, or foreign affairs. Even the EU and the United States, with
their vast legal resources, often include specialized outside lawyers
(e.g., from private law firms or academia) in their legal teams pre-
paring litigation strategies, written submissions, rebuttals, and re-
joinders.
In order to design effective dispute prevention and settlement
strategies, different kinds of economic disputes must be distin-
guished according to the public and private interests involved.235
6.2.1. Secondary disputes over prohibited trade discrimination:
Domestic legal and judicial remedies can prevent
intergovernmental disputes
Most WTO disputes are about discriminatory import restric-
tions or export subsidies that are inconsistent with the self-
imposed WTO obligations of governments (e.g., GATT Articles I-
III) and, according to welfare economics, reduce the consumer wel-
fare of domestic citizens. Even though WTO law permits various
kinds of import protection (e.g., pursuant to GATT Articles II, VI
and XIX) and domestic subsidies, governments are often pres-
sured to resort to prohibited and non-transparent forms of trade
protection for the benefit of powerful domestic interest groups in
exchange for political support (e.g., for election campaigns and
other domestic legislation). Such intergovernmental disputes over
welfare-reducing trade discrimination can be described as secon-
dary conflicts among states that arise when governments fail to use
first best policy instruments, such as the nondiscriminatory inter-
235 See generally Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Prevention and Settlement of Transat-
lantic Disputes, in TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC DispuTEs: THE EU, THE US AND THE
WTO, supra note 43, at 34, 583.
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nal regulation of either market failures or supply of public goods,
at home for domestic political reasons.
Reciprocal WTO commitments and domestic implementation
and enforcement of WTO rules can assist governments in overcom-
ing the producer biases of national trade policymaking by commit-
ting governments to reciprocal guarantees of the rule of law and
the protection of general citizen welfare. In constitutional democ-
racies, such government failures can be prevented most effectively
by empowering adversely affected citizens to defend the rule of
law by enforcing precise, unconditional, and democratically-
approved WTO prohibitions of trade discrimination in domestic
courts. As confirmed by the decentralized judicial application and
enforcement of the EC's common market rules, national judges
have long-standing expertise in enforcing such prohibitions of dis-
crimination in economic and other fields of law (e.g., human rights,
labor, and constitutional law). Many WTO dispute settlement pro-
ceedings might be prevented by empowering domestic citizens
and national judges to protect the rule of law (including compli-
ance with precise and unconditional WTO guarantees of freedom,
non-discrimination, and the rule of law) against discriminatory in-
terest-group politics and administrative protectionism in violation
of the democratically-approved WTO obligations of governments.
6.2.2. Primary disputes over non-discriminatory internal
regulation: The need for judicial deference at national and
international levels
The increasing number of regulatory disputes over non-
discriminatory internal regulations- such as product, production,
tax, health, and environmental regulations -reflect different con-
flicts of interests. Economic and democratic theory explain that
nondiscriminatory internal regulations may legitimately differ
from country to country as long as they comply with relevant non-
discrimination, necessity, and other legal requirements (e.g., for
transparent risk-assessment and approval procedures for national
standards pursuant to the WTO Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards).236 Respect for democracy,
the sovereign equality of states, regulatory competition, and inter-
national regulatory cooperation tend to be first-best policy instru-
236 Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards, supra note 229, arts.
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ments, requiring positive and negative comity, mutual recognition
of equivalent standards, 237 or internationally agreed-upon har-
monization of divergent national rules. Such intergovernmental
disputes require national and international judicial deference vis-at-
vis legitimate, democratic rule-making. As foreign interests tend to
be under-represented in this sort of behind-the-border regulation,
related disputes often involve claims of indirect de facto discrimi-
nation prohibited by WTO Article XVII. 238 In cases of non-
discriminatory measures (e.g., prohibition of genetically modified
organisms), there may be primary conflicts of interests due to le-
gitimate regulatory and democratic divergences (e.g., more sci-
ence-based health standards in the United States than in Europe)
that often cannot be overcome through international adjudication.
6.2.3. "High policy disputes" to be prevented and settled through
political negotiations
International dispute settlement practice (e.g., in GATT and at
the WTO) suggests that there may be high policy disputes whose
political dimensions are inappropriate for judicial proceedings.
The security exceptions in GATT and WTO law 239 are drafted and
interpreted so broadly that economic sanctions for foreign policy
reasons (e.g., sanctions in response to expropriations of foreign
property in Cuba, apartheid policy in South Africa, or the military
occupation of the Malvinas islands by Argentina) have been rarely
challenged in GATT and WTO dispute settlement proceedings.
The 1984 GATT panel report on Nicaragua's complaint against U.S.
import restrictions imposed for foreign policy reasons concluded
that the import restrictions violated GATT Article XIII:2. As the
United States had not invoked any GATT exceptions, the panel re-
237 For examples of mutual recognition of equivalent standards, see the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, art. 6, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, The Legal
Texts-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Agree-
ment on Technical Barriers to Trade]; Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Standards, supra note 229, art. 4; and GATS, supra note 106, art. 7.
238 See, e.g., GATT, supra note 29, art. 3 (requiring national treatment for taxa-
tion and regulation); GATS, supra note 106, arts. 2, 17 (outlining most favored na-
tion treatment); see also Francesco Ortino, WTO Jurisprudence on De Jure and De
Facto Discrimination, in WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 217.
239 See, e.g., GATT, supra note 29, art. 21 (stating that nothing in the Agree-
ment prevents parties from taking any action it considers necessary for the protec-
tion of essential security interests with respect to fissionable material or arms in
wartime).
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port did not examine whether the violation of Article XIII:2 could
be justified under GATT Article XXI.240 Both parties recognized
that Nicaragua's rights to take countermeasures under GATT Arti-
cle XXIII:2 were not practical in view of the U.S. trade embargo,
and that the termination of the U.S. sanctions depended on a reso-
lution of the foreign policy conflict.
In the WTO dispute over the Helms-Burton legislation extend-
ing U.S. sanctions against Cuba to companies from the EC that en-
gaged in business transactions with Cuba, the EC requested the es-
tablishment of a WTO dispute settlement panel when bilateral
consultations failed to settle the dispute. The EC thereby strength-
ened its negotiation position by demonstrating that a WTO dispute
settlement ruling against the United States was a credible BATNA.
Afterwards, the EC preferred to negotiate-in the shadow of the
law -a bilaterally agreed-upon settlement of the dispute as part of
a broader Understanding with Respect to Disciplines for the
Strengthening of Investment Protection, which both parties pro-
posed for inclusion into a multilateral investment agreement.241 By
drawing attention to legally available alternatives and transform-
ing the bilateral dispute into a multilateral dispute prevention
strategy, the EC succeeded in elaborating a mutually beneficial po-
litical solution.
Third-party adjudication in the WTO may be inappropriate in
areas of broad foreign policy discretion. Until recently, 242 less-
developed WTO members never challenged the political condi-
tions attached to the voluntary Generalized System of Preferences
("GSP") granted by developed countries through GATT or WTO
dispute settlement proceedings. India carefully limited its success-
ful WTO panel proceeding in 2003 to the drug arrangements for
combating drug production and trafficking in Pakistan, without
240 See Panel Report, United States - Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua: Com-
munication from Nicaragua, L/5802 (May 6, 1985); GATT Council, Minutes of Meet-
ing Held in the Centre William Rappard on 29 May 1985, C/M/188 (June 28, 1985)
(detailing the dispute between Nicaragua and the United States). On this dispute
and other GATT practices relating to Article XXI, see WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 600-08 (noting the interpreta-
tion and application of Article XXI).
241 See Hugo Paemen, Avoidance and Settlement of "High Policy Disputes": Les-
sons from the Dispute over "The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act", in
TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC DISPUTES: THE EU, THE U.S. AND THE WTO, supra note
43, at 361-70.
242 For the complaint by India challenging the consistency of the EC's condi-
tions for the granting of tariff preferences, see supra note 100.
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challenging the human rights conditionality and environmental
conditionality of the EC's GSP. Judicial deference towards policy
discretion also explains the longstanding GATT and WTO juris-
prudence that legislation authorizing future violations of WTO
rules is presumed to be WTO-compatible as long as such violations
are not mandated and remain a matter of discretion.
243
6.2.4. International disputes over private rights should be left to
domestic courts and transnational arbitration
Most disputes over foreign trade restrictions, investments, and
intellectual property rights are settled through negotiations, re-
course to domestic courts, or mixed investor-state arbitration (e.g.,
pursuant to ICSID, UNICTRAL, or NAFTA Chapter 11 rules). Less
than ten percent of all WTO disputes refer to intellectual property
claims based on TRIPS, to claims that trade-related investment
measures are inconsistent with GATS rules protecting services
suppliers, or to TRIMS protections for foreign investors. 244 While
most WTO disputes challenge general legislative or regulatory
measures, some of them relate to private commercial disputes
among private companies, like the WTO dispute over the conflict-
ing claims of EC and U.S. competitors over the trademark "Havana
Club."245
Some of the more than twenty investor-state arbitration pro-
ceedings under NAFTA Chapter 11 over private claims demanding
compensation for regulatory takings have been widely criticized
because of an alleged producer bias of NAFTA rules in favor of
243 On the GATT and WTO jurisprudence that legislation mandating a viola-
tion of WTO obligations can be WTO-incompatible, while legislation giving ex-
ecutive discretion to violate those obligations may be WTO-compatible, see Sharif
Bhuiyan, Mandatory and Discretionary Legislation: The Continued Relevance of the
Distinction under the WTO, 5 J. INT'L ECON L. 571, 573 (2002) (explaining the distinc-
tion made between mandatory and discretionary legislation in GATT and WTO
jurisprudence).
244 For a discussion of the four WTO disputes relating to TRIMS, see Martha
Lara de Sterlini, The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, in THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGAL, POLMCAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 537, 537 (Patrick
F.J. Macrory et al. eds., 2005) (providing an overview of TRIMS and related WTO
jurisprudence).
245 See Panel Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hor-
mones): Complaint by the United States, WT/DS26/R (Aug. 18, 1997); see also Appel-
late Body Report, United States -Section 211 Omnibus: Appropriations Act of 1998,
WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002) (adopted Jan. 2, 2002) (noting the panel's conclu-
sions on Section 211). See generally Abbott & Cottier, supra note 115.
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broadly defined investor rights based on the traditional interna-
tional minimum standards for the protection of aliens, non-
transparent arbitration proceedings, and their one-sided focus on
private rights over public interests.24 6 Rather than politicizing and
transforming disputes over private rights into intergovernmental
WTO disputes with the possibility of welfare-reducing trade sanc-
tions, governments should leave such disputes to domestic courts
and transparent international court proceedings based on nondis-
criminatory rules, as it is done inside the EC where the EC Treaty
"in no way prejudice[s] the rules in Member States governing the
system of property ownership." 247 Since private property is pro-
tected in the national constitutional laws of all EC Member States,
and every EC Member State also accepted the guarantees of private
property in Protocol 1 to the ECHR, disputes over regulatory tak-
ings by EC Member States are decided on the basis of non-
discriminatory rules and transparent procedures in national courts
subject to review by the ECtHR. Just as traders and investors from
other EC Member States are protected in a nondiscriminatory
manner by domestic courts inside the EC based on national and in-
ternationally agreed-upon rules, disputes involving traders and
investors from other WTO member countries could be settled most
effectively by domestic courts, provided that they duly note inter-
national law, including democratically approved WTO rules.
6.2.5. Surveillance of implementation of WTO dispute settlement
rulings may lead to political and legal follow-up disputes
The adoption of dispute settlement findings by the WTO en-
tails "recommendations" and/or legally binding rulings 248 that
usually settle the legal dispute over the correct interpretation of
WTO rules. This clarification of the primary legal rights and obli-
gations of the WTO members concerned does not, however, neces-
sarily ensure a definitive political settlement of the dispute by
means of compliance with the secondary WTO obligations "to se-
cure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are found
246 See generally INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC
PROBLEMS: A GUIDE TO NAFTA's CONTROVERSIAL CHAPTER ON INVESTORS RIGHTS
(2000), available at http://ww.iisd.org/pdf/tradecitizensguide.pdf (last visited
Apr. 8, 2006) (outlining the use of NAFTA Chapter 11 by multinational corpora-
tions to challenging public regulations, and the problems therein).
247 EC Treaty art. 295.
248 See DSU, supra note 33, art. 21; GATF, supra note 29, art. 23.
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to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agree-
ments."249 In the WTO disputes over EC import restrictions on ba-
nanas and hormone-fed beef, or over the U.S. export subsidies for
foreign sales corporations ("FSCs"), the WTO dispute settlement
rulings were not implemented within the "reasonable period of
time" 250 and led to follow-up disputes over the consistency of WTO
implementing measures and the amount of countermeasures pur-
suant to Article 22 of the DSU. Even if the legal dispute settlement
findings have been accepted at the international level, their domes-
tic implementation (e.g., through changes of domestic legislation)
may entail additional legal, political, and economic disputes at the
WTO (e.g., "compliance panel proceedings" pursuant to Article 21
of the DSU) or at home -for instance, in the political efforts at get-
ting a parliamentary majority for new legislation and fending off
interest group claims for financial compensation. The DSU rules
on "Surveillance of Implementation of Recommendations and Rul-
ings," 251 and "Compensation and the Suspension of Conces-
sions" 252 recognize the different legal and political dimensions of
such follow-up disputes by providing for recourse to arbitration
and special panel procedures with short deadlines.
6.3. Institutionalizing ADR Methods for Certain Kinds of WTO
Disputes
In contrast to the frequent recourse to mediation and concilia-
tion for the settlement of private international business disputes,
Article 5 of the DSU on good offices, conciliation, and mediation
has been invoked in WTO practice only rarely. Under GATT 1947,
there had been only three cases in which the provisions on good
offices, mediation, and conciliation by the Director-General (e.g., in
paragraph 8 of the 1979 GATT Understanding on Dispute Settle-
ment) had been resorted to.253 All three cases involved complaints
against developed countries. Two of these mediation efforts by the
249 See DSU, supra note 33, art. 3.7.
250 Id. art. 21.
251 Id.
252 Id. art. 22.
253 For analysis of cases such as the dispute between the EC and the United
States regarding EC tariff treatment of citrus products in 1982, between the EC
and Japan concerning pricing and trading practices for copper in Japan in 1987,
and between the EC and Canada concerning Article XXIV negotiations in 1988,
see Course on Dispute Settlement, supra note 114.
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Director-General, or by his representative, were not successful (i.e.,
the mediation by the Director-General in the 1982 Citrus Preferences
dispute between the EC and the United States and the good offices
by the Director-General in the 1992 Banana dispute between devel-
oping countries and the EC). The very limited success of the man-
datory conciliation phase in the Subsidies Committee pursuant to
the 1979 Tokyo Round Agreement on Subsidies has prompted
WTO members to refrain from making conciliation compulsory
under the dispute settlement provisions of the WTO Agreement on
Subsidies prior to submission of the dispute to a WTO panel.
In a communication dated July 17, 2001, the Director-General
notified WTO members of his willingness to assist them in good of-
fices, mediation, and conciliation pursuant to Article 5.6 of the DSU
and emphasized the need for making Article 5 operational.25 4 The
communication set out detailed procedures for requesting action
pursuant to Article 5 of the DSU.255 For the first time in GAT[ and
WTO dispute settlement practice, applicants are requested to spec-
ify the nature of their Article 5 demand in view of the legal differ-
ences between good offices, conciliation, and mediation.256 As nei-
ther the Director-General nor his deputy are trained mediation and
conciliation experts, the procedures enable the Director-General to
allow Secretariat staff and/or outside consultants to assist in the
process and ensure that such support staff has no direct involve-
ment in the dispute in question either before or after the Article 5
procedure. The communication states that:
[Tihe Director-General does not expect to provide "advi-
sory opinions," strictly speaking, although informal non-
legal advice regarding the best path to finding a solution
may be appropriate. Legal conclusions regarding a particu-
lar dispute are best left to the formal dispute settlement
process. Rather, Article 5 proceedings should be seen more
254 See Communication from the Director-General, Article 5 of the Dispute Set-
tlement Understanding, WT/DSB/25 (July 17, 2001) (noting current practices re-
lated to Article 5 DSU) [hereinafter Communication from the Director-General].
255 Id. Attachment B.
256 See id. passim. Good offices, conciliation, and mediation are three different
ways the Director-General may participate in resolving differences between
Member States. Good offices focus on logistical and Secretariat support. Concilia-
tion involves direct participation in negotiations. Mediation entails proposing so-
lutions (if appropriate). The Director-General may change roles with some flexi-
bility.
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as efforts to assist in reaching a mutually agreed-upon solu-
tion. It should also be recalled that Article 25 provides for
Arbitration and the Director-General does not wish to en-
croach upon this provision of the DSU.
257
Article 5 of the DSU was invoked for the first time in Septem-
ber 2002 in a joint request for mediation by the Philippines, Thai-
land, and the EC. The purpose of the requested mediation process
was:
[T]o examine the extent to which the legitimate interests of
the Philippines and Thailand are being unduly impaired as
a result of the implementation by the European Communi-
ties of the preferential tariff treatment for canned tuna
originating in ACP states. In the event that the mediator
concludes that undue impairment has in fact occurred, the
mediator could consider means by which this situation may
be addressed.
25s
In the spring of 2003, the EC accepted the unpublished mediation
proposal and implemented it through an EC regulation.
The "Procedures for Requesting Action Pursuant to Article 5 of
the DSU" -as attached to the Communication from the Director-
General dated July 17, 2001 -do not deal with all the ADR tech-
niques that are commonly used in private business law in order to
avoid recourse to court litigation (such as mini-trials).259 In WTO
law no less than in private business law, ADR methods and forum
choice become increasingly important in certain kinds of disputes
(e.g., involving trade-related intellectual property rights, private
investment rights of services suppliers, and government procure-
ment contracts) which may be submitted, alternatively or simulta-
neously, to domestic, regional, or worldwide dispute settlement
procedures in national or regional courts, transnational ICSID and
WIPO arbitration, or intergovernmental WTO dispute settlement
proceedings. The successful WTO mediations in 2002 and 2003
suggests that disputes over trade-distorting effects of trade prefer-
ences (e.g., under the GSP, customs unions, and free trade areas)
257 Id.
258 Communication from the Director-General, Request for Mediation by the
Phillippines, Thailand, and The European Communities, 3, WT/GC/66, (Oct. 16,
2002).
259 Communication from the Director-General, supra note 254.
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may be easier to settle through recourse to political third-party
mediation in the WTO than through quasi-judicial procedures, es-
pecially if the complainant appeals to the political discretion of
preference-granting countries rather than -as in the case of India's
complaint against the EC's tariff preferences for combating drug
production in Pakistan- challenges the legal inconsistency of dis-
criminatory tariff preferences with GATT Article I and the Ena-
bling Clause.
260
Why is it that ADR is increasingly being recognized as an im-
portant alternative to adversarial arbitration or court litigation
whose higher costs, longer duration, and sometimes less predict-
ability (e.g., in case of juries and punitive damages) are viewed as
less advantageous than ADR in private national and international
commercial law but apparently not in public international law?
261
State practice in multilateral treaty relations with compulsory ju-
risdiction (such as WTO law) suggests that governments prefer to
invoke and enforce their rights in "private/public partnerships in
WTO litigation." 26 2 Private economic operators may be reluctant to
compromise the rule of law through ad hoc solutions to individual
disputes that may undermine future legal predictability and cer-
tainty. The preconditions and potential advantages of ADR in pri-
vate commercial relations (e.g., private control over the dispute,
and the avoidance of long, unpredictable, and costly court pro-
ceedings and jury verdicts) are very different from those in WTO
dispute settlement proceedings that tend to be short, predictable
and less costly than private arbitration (the costs of WTO dispute
settlement proceedings tend to be covered by the governments in-
volved). WTO dispute settlement proceedings are also likely to
create precedents for the future interpretation of WTO rules in fu-
ture disputes affecting other governments and private economic
operators beyond the control of parties to a dispute.
As in private business law, the interests of the economic opera-
tors affected by violations of WTO rules may not necessarily corre-
spond to the self-interests of their attorneys or to the diplomatic in-
terests of their home governments. The legal remedies available in
alternative fora may vary considerably (e.g., reparation of injury
260 See Panel Report, supra note 100.
261 See e.g. Berman, supra note 62, at 451-64 (discussing alternative dispute
resolution and international law).
262 See generally SHAFFER, supra note 40 (discussing public/private partner-
ships in detail).
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and financial compensation being available on the basis of general
international law principles of state responsibility in ICJ and ICSID
but not in WTO proceedings). Private producers, investors, im-
porters, exporters, and service suppliers may have good reasons to
handle and control certain dispute settlement proceedings them-
selves (e.g., in domestic court proceedings or mixed international
arbitration proceedings) rather than requesting their home gov-
ernment to take up their complaint in the WTO. The initiative by
the WTO Director-General in July 2001 for more effective media-
tion and conciliation procedures should not preclude further con-
sideration of the usefulness of an "ADR Centre" financed by pri-
vate industries (and complementing the Advisory Centre for WTO
Law established in 2001). This would offer-for certain categories
of disputes, such as the independent review procedures outlined in
Article 4 of the WTO Agreement on Preshipment Inspection for
Disputes Among Pre-Shipment Inspection Companies and Export-
ers- the option of alternative neutral evaluation, mini-trials, and
other ADR techniques by trained mediators.
6.4. Need for Promoting Comity Among International Tribunals and
Judicial Cooperation in the Enforcement of the Rule of Law
The legalization of international trade relations and the prolif-
eration of international courts have led to more judicial dispute set-
tlement in international relations.26 3 In addition to the increasing
number of worldwide and regional courts and (quasi-)judicial dis-
pute settlement procedures (e.g., pursuant to regional and world-
wide human rights, trade, and environmental agreements), indi-
vidual access to justice has become recognized as a human right
264
and contributes to the emergence of a global community of
courts. 265 An increasing number of worldwide and regional trade
agreements explicitly guarantee individual access to domestic
courts and judicial remedies against illegal trade restrictions. If
export industries, for example in the United States, want to chal-
263 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.
J. 191, 191 (2003) (describing the increasing use of international dispute resolution
courts and tribunals). Shany lists more than twenty new international adjudica-
tive mechanisms and quasi-judicial procedures established since the mid-1980s.
See SHANY, supra note 31, at 5-7.
264 See generally Harlow, supra note 14, passim (arguing access to legal services
is an important part of a human rights agenda).
265 See Slaughter, supra note 263.
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lenge foreign trade restrictions, they may either petition the U.S.
government to initiate intergovernmental dispute settlement pro-
ceedings in worldwide or regional fora (e.g., at the WTO or pursu-
ant to NAFTA Chapter 20266), or they may initiate judicial proceed-
ings themselves in foreign courts or regional courts (e.g., in the EC
Court, EFTA, NAFTA panel proceedings pursuant to Chapter 19,
or mixed arbitration pursuant to NAFTA Chapter 11). Export in-
dustries in developing countries, by contrast, often lack the finan-
cial and legal resources for equivalent transnational or intergov-
ernmental litigation strategies.
267
The increasing number of international courts and (quasi-) ju-
dicial procedures have been established independently on the basis
of different treaties with different objectives and constituencies.
Hence, there is no formal hierarchy between the different interna-
tional courts. For example, even though the ICJ has jurisdiction to
adjudicate any legal dispute between states, UN Member States
remain free to submit their legal disputes to other international
courts of general jurisdiction (like the PCA) or specialized jurisdic-
tion (like the UN Law of the Sea Tribunal). 268 Competing jurisdic-
tions are also frequent for private international complaints-for
example, complaints based on regional or worldwide human rights
instruments.269 Even after intergovernmental judicial proceedings
266 See NAFTA, supra note 98, ch. 20 (outlining institutional arrangements and
dispute settlement procedures).
267 For more information on developing countries' frequent lack of legal in-
frastructure allowing private and public partnerships to challenge foreign trade
restrictions (e.g., domestic legislation similar to Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act
or the EC's Trade Barriers Regulation for cooperation among the government
agencies in preparing a WTO dispute settlement proceeding and private economic
interest), see generally Gregory Shaffer, How to Make the ITO Dispute Settlement
System Work for Developing Countries: Some Proactive Developing Country Strategies,
in TOWARDS A DEVELOPMENT-SUPPORTIVE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM IN THE WTO
(International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development 2003).
268 The non-exclusive jurisdiction of the ICJ is emphasized in Article 95 of the
UN Charter. See U.N. Charter art. 95 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall pre-
vent Members of the United Nations from entrusting the solution of their differ-
ences to other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in existence or which may
be concluded in the future.").
269 See SHANY, supra note 31, at 8 ("[O]n some forty occasions human rights
complaints have been lodged by the same individuals under more than one hu-
man rights mechanism .... "). There have also been cases of overlapping jurisdic-
tion between the UN Human Rights Committee and the ILO's Freedom of Asso-
ciation Committee since both monitor freedom of association. Id. at 48. The ILO
also had to deal with cases previously submitted to regional human rights proce-
dures.
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have been initiated, ADR mechanisms remain important, as re-
flected in those ICJ judgments which call for further negotiations
among parties to a dispute, define the legal principles to be taken
into account in such alternative dispute settlements, or otherwise
induce parties to reach a negotiated settlement. 270
The clauses for submission of disputes to the ICJ in the conven-
tions on the protection of intellectual property rights administered
by WIPO or in the Constitution of the International Labour Or-
ganization have never been used for submitting such economic
and social disputes to the ICJ. Whereas earlier FCNs271 used to in-
clude compromise clauses providing for the settlement of disputes
by the ICJ, most modern BITs now provide for investor-state and
interstate arbitration rather than for ICJ jurisdiction. Regional eco-
nomic integration 27 2 and WTO law 273 often provide for exclusive
jurisdiction to their. respective dispute settlement bodies if "Mem-
bers seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullifica-
tion or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements ...
S"274 Such exclusive jurisdiction clauses have, however, not pre-
vented simultaneous or successive trade disputes at the WTO and
in regional fora (e.g., the ECJ and NAFTA panels) to scrutinize the
same governmental measures from different legal perspectives.
According to NAFTA Article 2005,
[s]ubject to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, disputes regarding any
matter arising under both this Agreement and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, any agreement negotiated
thereunder, or any successor agreement (GATT), may be
settled in either forum at the discretion of the complaining
Party.2
75
270 See, generally, INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE, 324-69 (Connie Peck & Roy S. Leeds eds., 1997) (debating past and fu-
ture development of the ICJ).
271 See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Arg., July
27, 1853, 10 Stat. 1005.
272 See, e.g., EC Treaty art. 292 ("Member States undertake not to submit a dis-
pute concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty to any method of
settlement other than those provided for therein."). Similar exclusive jurisdiction
provisions exist in the Andean Community and in the Central American Integra-
tion for the international courts set up by these agreements.
273 DSU, supra note 33, art 23.
274 Id. art 23.1.
275 NAFTA, supra note 98, art. 2005, 1.
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Paragraph 6 of Article 2005, however, prescribes that, "[o]nce dis-
pute settlement procedures have been initiated under Article 2007
or dispute settlement proceedings have been initiated under the
GATT, the forum selected shall be used to the exclusion of the
other, unless a Party makes a request pursuant to paragraph 3 or
4" (i.e., the special dispute settlement procedures for disputes relat-
ing to environmental, sanitary, phytosanitary, or standards-related
measures) .276
Competing and overlapping jurisdictions for the resolution of
the same legal dispute pose legal problems if they lead to conflict-
ing judgments, legal insecurity, or a waste of scarce legal and other
resources in the case of multiple litigation. In private national and
international law, such problems are countered by legislative and
judicial limitations of unilateral forum shopping (e.g., judicial dis-
regard of forum selection agreements that are neither fair nor rea-
sonable), parallel proceedings (e.g., refusal of jurisdiction in case of
lis alibi pendens), and the abuse of rights (e.g., electa una via princi-
ple). The lis alibi pendens rule prohibiting initiation of another judi-
cial proceeding during a pending judicial proceeding on the same
legal claims among the same parties and the res judicata rule pre-
cluding relitigation of the final judgment of a competent tribunal
have been accepted by international courts as generally-recognized
principles of law and judicial comity among courts in the exercise
of their judicial function. 277 The application of these private law
rules on competing and overlapping jurisdictions by international
courts in the field of public international law, however, remains
rare and leaves open many questions. Some of these questions
could be legally clarified in the cooperation agreements among the
WTO and other international organizations with distinct dispute
settlement procedures, such as WIPO and ITU.
GATT and WTO dispute settlement panels were often re-
quested to take into account the precedential legal effects of earlier
GATT dispute settlement rulings or decisions- such as on the con-
276 Id. art. 2005, 6. In the recent U.S. complaint against Mexico-Tax Measures
on Soft Drinks and other Beverages, the Appellate Body confirmed the WTO jurisdic-
tion to decide this complaint and noted "that Mexico has expressly stated that the
so-called 'exclusion clause' of Article 2005.6 of the NAFTA had not been exer-
cised." 54, WT/DS308/AB/R (March 6, 2006).
277 See SHANY supra note 31, at 279. (defining lis alibi pendens and res judicata).
The principle that electa una via (election of one forum) may preclude the plaintiff
from submitting the same dispute among the same parties to another tribunal is
closely related to the principle contained in the lis alibi pendens rule.
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sistency of national balance-of-payments restrictions with GATT
Article XVIII or on preferential tariffs and other discriminatory
preferential trade arrangements with GATT Article XXIV-when
newly established dispute settlement panels examined the legality
of the same government measures previously reviewed by other
GATT bodies. A 1989 GATT panel examined, for a third time,
complaints against EC import restrictions on apples and
construed its terms of reference to mean that it was author-
ized to examine the matter referred to it by Chile in the
light of all relevant provisions of the General Agreement
and those related to its interpretation and implementation.
It would take into account the 1980 Panel report and the le-
gitimate expectations created by the adoption of this report,
but also other circumstances of this complaint. The Panel,
therefore, did not feel it was legally bound by all the details
and legal reasoning of the 1980 Panel report .... While tak-
ing careful note of the earlier panel reports, the Panel did
not consider they relieved it of the responsibility, under its
terms of reference, to carry out its own thorough examina-
tion .... 278
In July 1985, the United States requested that the GATT Coun-
cil apply the legal findings of a previously adopted panel report on
Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather2 79 to quantitative restrictions
on leather footwear maintained by Japan, since "the same adminis-
trative and legal scheme was used to restrict imports of leather
footwear as was used for leather."280 Other GATT members ex-
pressed "reservations regarding the proposal that one panel's rec-
ommendations could be applied to another dispute; surely, only a
panel could determine whether the cases in question were totally
identical." The Council agreed to establish a new dispute settle-
ment panel. 281 The 1983 GATT report of the panel, United States -
Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies,282 was adopted "on
278 GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 703 (1994)
[hereinafter GAIT ANALYTICAL INDEX].
279 Panel Report, Panel on Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather, L/5623 (Mar.
2, 1984).
2W GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 17-
19 July 1985, 37, C/M/191 (Sept. 11, 1985).
281 Id.
282 Panel Report, United States-Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assem-
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the understanding that this shall not foreclose future examination
of the use of Section 337 [of the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930] to deal with
patent infringement cases from the point of view of consistency
with Articles III and XX of the General Agreement." 283 The 1989
GATT panel report United States Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930
again examined complaints (this time by the EC) challenging the
use of Section 337 in connection with patent enforcement and, con-
trary to the 1983 panel findings against Canada's similar com-
plaints, found the discriminatory restrictions to be inconsistent
with GATT Article 111:4 and not necessary or otherwise justifiable
under GATT Article XX(d).
28 4
When Brazil requested the GATT Council to establish a dispute
settlement panel to examine the U.S. denial of most-favored-nation
treatment of non-rubber footwear imports from Brazil in March
1991, the United States objected on the ground "that this matter
had already been adjudicated" under GATT in 1988 and "re-
adjudication would violate the fundamental jurisprudential prin-
ciple of res judicata -a final decision on a matter constituted an ab-
solute bar to subsequent action thereon ... the earlier Panel had
taken all of Brazil's arguments into account in reaching its deci-
sion"; the Panel was established at the following GATT Council
meeting in view of the fact that, inter alia, the 1988 panel proceed-
ing had taken place under a separate agreement (the 1979 Tokyo
Round Agreement on Subsidies), and the earlier panel report had
not been adopted. 285 Similar to this dispute settlement practice un-
der GATT 1947, several WTO dispute settlement panels have clari-
fied the extent to which earlier WTO decisions (e.g., on the consis-
tency of balance of payments restrictions with GATT Article XVIII
and the consistency of free trade area agreements with GATT Arti-
cle XXIV), and dispute settlement rulings are to be taken into ac-
count by subsequent dispute settlement panels.
28 6
Even if WTO dispute settlement bodies are not formally bound
blies, L/5333 (May 26, 1983).
283 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 26
May 1983, 10, C/M/168 (June 14,1983).
284 Report of the Panel, United States- Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,
L/6439, (Nov. 7, 1989) GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 393-96 (1990).
285 See GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 278, at 704.
286 See Frieder Roessler, The Institutional Balance between the Judicial and the Po-
litical Organs of the W/TO, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN H. JACKSON 325 (Marco Bronckers & Reinhardt Quick
eds., 2000).
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to follow their earlier jurisprudence (stare decisis), there is hardly
any GATT or WTO dispute settlement report that does not justify
its interpretation of GATT and WTO rules by reference to legal or
(quasi-)judicial interpretations adopted in previous GATT and
WTO practices and precedents. The mutual coordination of multi-
ple dispute settlement rulings under the variety of GATT and
WTO dispute settlement procedures evolves pragmatically case-
by-case rather than by recourse to general WTO rules on forum
shopping and parallel and successive proceedings. WTO dispute
settlement reports apply general international law rules in the light
of the jurisprudence of other international courts (notably the ICJ)
or refer to treaties (e.g., on the protection of the environment) con-
cluded among WTO members outside the WTO, even though such
judicial comity has so far hardly been shown by other international
courts vis-a-vis WTO jurisprudence. Parallel proceedings before
national and international courts are frequent in WTO dispute set-
tlement practice; yet, in conformity with the jurisprudence of other
tribunals, they are not perceived as jurisdictional conflicts because
the complainants, legal claims, and applicable law tend to differ.
7. CONCLUSIONS: JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION AS INCENTIVE FOR
JUDICIAL COOPERATION AND FOR THE PROMOTION OF THE RULE-OF-
LAW THROUGH JUDICIAL NETWORKS
Businesses increasingly resort to new ways of resolving trans-
national disputes by international arbitration or mediation so as to
limit the risks and costs of being involved in litigation in foreign
courts that risk disregarding relevant international trade rules and
commercial practices. 287 This contribution contends that the prolif-
eration of dispute settlement fora also in public international eco-
nomic law is, prima facie, a positive legal development reflecting an
enhanced willingness by governments to strengthen the rule of in-
ternational law in transnational relations. As the very broad scope
of WTO law overlaps with numerous other international and re-
gional agreements, cooperation among international and national
courts becomes ever more important for maintaining the rule of
law and reducing transaction costs, particularly in international re-
lations among producers, investors, traders, and consumers. Simi-
287 See Jennifer Hughes, Businesses Adopt New Ways of Resolving Disputes, FIN.
TIMES, June 22, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 9774826 (mentioning a twenty-five
percent rise in demand for international arbitration in the past five years).
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lar to the increasing reliance on private international arbitration,
intergovernmental "expeditious arbitration within the WTO as an
alternative means of dispute settlement" 288 could enable private
parties and governments to broaden the applicable law and further
improve the applicable procedures for the settlement of interna-
tional economic disputes in the WTO, with better regard to other
relevant international economic rules (e.g., on intellectual property
rights, investor rights, legal remedies, human rights, labor, and so-
cial rights) than may be possible in normal WTO panel proceed-
ings or in arbitration proceedings outside the WTO.
The rule-oriented WTO dispute settlement system clearly miti-
gates power disparities in international relations and helps gov-
ernments limit power politics inside their countries (e.g., by limit-
ing protectionist abuses of trade policy discretion in favor of rent-
seeking interest groups by requiring independent judicial remedies
inside countries like China that did not have such legal institutions
prior to WTO membership). The clarification of GATT and WTO
rules through GATT and WTO dispute settlement findings is in-
creasingly influencing other multilateral WTO negotiations and, in
some instances (e.g., the U.S.-EC oilseed dispute settlement find-
ings leading to the 1992 Blair House Agreement), has been of cru-
cial importance for the successful conclusion of trade agreements
under GATT and at the WTO.289 While the progressive clarifica-
tion of international trade rules through WTO jurisprudence (e.g.,
over thirty-five WTO dispute settlement findings on antidumping
rules and over forty WTO dispute settlement interpretations of
WTO subsidy rules) continues to be implemented in the adminis-
trative practices of WTO governments within a reasonable period
of time, domestic legislatures are often reluctant to adjust domestic
legislation, just as domestic courts may be reluctant to adjust their
judicial practices in light of WTO jurisprudence.
The frequent legal inconsistencies between (quasi-)judicial rul-
ings of WTO dispute settlement bodies, regional trade courts (e.g.,
288 DSU, supra note 33, art. 25.
289 For empirical evidence of the influence of GATT dispute settlement pro-
ceedings on the conclusion of the 1979 Tokyo and 1994 Uruguay Round Agree-
ments, as well as the influence of recent WTO dispute settlement proceedings (e.g.
on cotton, dairy, and sugar subsidies) on the Doha Development Round negotia-
tions at the WTO, see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Strategic Use of WTO Dispute Set-
tlement Proceedings for Advancing VATO Negotiations on Agriculture, in REFORMING
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LEGITIMACY, EFFICIENCY AND DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE 127 (Emst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 2005).
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the EC Court and NAFTA panels), and domestic courts regarding
the interpretation and application of international trade law con-
firm that -in international trade law no less than in other fields of
public international law-national and international courts do not
yet constitute a coherent legal and judicial system. Outside re-
gional systems (like EC, European human rights, and, to a lesser
extent, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and Andean common market law),
judicial coordination and cooperation among international courts,
as well as among national courts, to avoid inconsistent decisions -
even on the legality of the same government measures (e.g., the EC
import restrictions on bananas)- remains rare. The inherent pow-
er of courts to exercise comity towards and cooperate with other
tribunals in the maintenance of the rule of law are rarely used
among international courts.290 The proliferation of international
dispute settlement fora and the (sometimes explicit) admission
(e.g., under NAFTA, Article 1 of the MERCOSUR Olivos Protocol,
and many bilateral free trade agreements) of free choice among
competing jurisdictions encourages forum and rule shopping so as,
for example, to win a dispute at the WTO which might be lost un-
der NAFTA, MERCOSUR, or in other regional dispute settlement
proceedings between the same parties. 291 Competition among dif-
ferent international courts, however, does not yet present a major
problem in international trade. Whereas forum shopping and
shopping in private international commercial law may seriously
inconvenience private parties attacked against their will in distant
fora applying foreign law, respondent parties in intergovernmental
litigation usually have the resources to defend themselves in inter-
national courts whose jurisdiction they have voluntarily accepted.
290 See Friedl Weiss, Inherent Powers of National and International Courts, in THE
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 1995-2003, supra note 41, at 177.
291 As NAFTA law permits choosing between NAFTA or WTO panels,
NAFTA Member States have so far resorted to only three panel proceedings pur-
suant to Chapter 20 of NAFTA and-notably in case of Canada and Mexico-
prefer submitting disputes to the more judicialized WTO dispute settlement pro-
ceedings. Less-developed WTO members have more favorable rights under WTO
dispute settlement proceedings (e.g., in the case of differential treatment and legal
assistance) than in many alternative regional dispute settlement fora (e.g., in case
of complaints against the EC under the Cotonou Agreement). Whereas many free
trade agreements (e.g., between Chile and Korea as well as between Australia and
the United States) reserve the option of submitting disputes over WTO rules to the
WTO, some bilateral and multilateral free trade area agreements (including the
current draft texts for a Free Trade Area of the Americas ("FTAA")) favor bilateral
dispute settlement procedures that are favorable for countries with large legal re-
sources (like the U.S.) but risk legal fragmentation.
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While the ICJ has been criticized for neglecting its constitu-
tional function in the UN legal system in favor of a pragmatic arbi-
tration-like resolution of many interstate disputes, 292 the regular in-
tervention by third parties in WTO and EC Court proceedings
illustrates that-in regional and worldwide economic law-the
systemic and constitutional functions of compulsory adjudication
are well recognized by states and courts. There are several reasons
that explain these different judicial practices (e.g., regarding third-
party intervention), such as the clearer focus of ICJ dispute settle-
ment proceedings on national interests (e.g., national borders, war,
and peace), the mixture of private, public, bilateral, and multilat-
eral interests in many trade disputes (e.g., about trade discrimina-
tion), or the elaboration of international court procedures by states
(e.g., in the case of the DSU) rather than by judges (particularly re-
garding the internal procedures of the ICJ). As most trade restric-
tions affect several countries, purely bilateral dispute settlement
proceedings remain an exception at the WTO. About one third of
WTO dispute settlement cases involve multiple complainants;
third parties intervene in more than eighty percent of all cases pur-
suant to Article 10 of the DSU.
2 93
Similar to the frequent criticism leveled by EC member gov-
ernments of the judicial governance and bold constitutional juris-
prudence by the ECJ, the already more than 200 WTO dispute set-
tlement reports are occasionally criticized -not only by academics
but also by WTO member governments- for contributing to an in-
stitutional imbalance between the strong "judicial branch" of the
WTO and its apparently less efficient "rule-making" and "execu-
tive" branches.294 For example, when the WTO Appellate Body
construed Articles 13 and 17 of the DSU as permitting unsolicited
amicus curiae briefs by NGOs, a special meeting of the WTO's Gen-
eral Council was convened and expressed strong criticism:
The Appellate Body had unfortunately ignored the over-
292 See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the
International Legal System and the International Court of Justice, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 791 (1999) (arguing that the proliferation of international courts will add to
the fragmentation of the international system); see also Emst-Ulrich Petersmann,
supra note 76, at 753 (arguing that worldwide compulsory adjudication of interna-
tional disputes is not as utopian as some have suggested).
293 DSU, supra note 33, art. 10.
294 See, e.g. Claus Dieter Ehlermann, Six Years on the Bench of the "World Trade
Court, in THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 1995-2003, supra note 41, at 499,
523-30.
2006]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
whelming sentiment of Members against acceptance of un-
solicited amicus curiae briefs. By introducing this additional
procedure, which amounted to soliciting amicus curiae briefs
from NGOs, the Appellate Body had indicated that it
wanted to go one step further in total disregard of the
views of the overwhelming majority of the WTO member-
ship.
295
When the Appellate Body reports in Canada - Measures affecting
the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products were dis-
cussed in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, many WTO members
criticized the new test that the Appellate Body read into the
Agreement on Agriculture for the purpose of determining
"whether a 'payment' exist[ed] under Article 9.1(c) ."..296 It noted
that the "[c]ost of production appeared nowhere in the text of the
Agreement on Agriculture, nor was it clear why 'proper value,'
which itself was a term that did not appear in the Agreement on
Agriculture, equated to cost of production .... It was odd that the
WTO would not consider the market as being a good indicator of
the value of goods." 297 It also noted that "[t]he finding of the Ap-
pellate Body clearly went beyond the ordinary meaning of the
words in the Agreement on Agriculture .... The Appellate Body
had failed a fundamental obligation of the treaty interpreter ....
The Appellate Body had clearly gone beyond what WTO members
had agreed upon in the Uruguay Round negotiations."
298
This institutionalized dialogue between the (quasi-)judicial
WTO dispute settlement and political bodies, the adoption of dis-
pute settlement reports by the DSB, and periodical, political WTO
negotiations on further improvements to the DSU are likely to
strengthen rather than weaken the evolution of the WTO dispute
295 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 22
November 2000, 31, WT/GC/M/60 (Jan. 23, 2001).
296 Appellate Body Report, Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk
and the Exportation of Dairy Products (Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by New
Zealand and the United States), 56, WT/DS113/AB/RW, WT/DS103/AB/RW
(Dec. 3, 2001).
297 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 18
December 2001, 33, WT/DSB/M/116 (Jan. 31, 2002). The panel finding, which
had used both domestic market prices as well as world market prices as bench-
marks for determining "payments in kind," had been reversed by the Appellate
Body without any convincing arguments.
298 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 17
January 2003, 14, WT/DSB/M/141 (Feb. 14, 2003).
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settlement system. In contrast to cases where interstate disputes
capable of being referred to the ICJ were instead submitted to ad
hoc arbitration,299 WTO members have not yet resorted to mutually
agreed-upon arbitration as an alternative to WTO panel or appel-
late proceedings. 300 The legitimacy and limited legal remedies of
WTO jurisprudence remain, nonetheless, under siege. For exam-
ple, many of the trade-related "human rights cases" in the ECJ
could similarly arise at the WTO, for instance when freedom of
trade (GATT Article XI:I) or freedom of transit (GATT Article V)
are restricted in order to protect the human rights of demonstrators
blocking motorways, 3 1 consumers objecting to genetically modi-
fied food, 302 or scientists using their freedom of speech to draw at-
tention to the dangers of microwave ovens. 30 3 There is not a single
GATT or WTO panel, appellate, or arbitration report whose legal
findings have, in the past, referred to the human rights obligations
of WTO members. Just as the EC Court has occasionally avoided
ruling on the human rights dimensions of trade disputes, 3°4 WTO
dispute settlement bodies also prefer to avoid making findings on
the human rights dimensions of WTO disputes. Even though the
numerous "general exceptions" in WTO agreements (e.g., GATT
Article XX, permitting "measures necessary to protect public mor-
als") offer ample legal possibilities for justifying trade restrictions
299 For an example of where the ICJ could have been seized based on the op-
tional clause declarations of all three states involved, see Southern Bluefin Tuna
Case (Austl. & N. Z. v. Japan), 39 I.L.M. 1359 (2000).
300 But see Brazil's WTO complaint against Argentina's safeguard restrictions
on cotton imports in Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Argentina -
Transitional Safeguard Measures of Certain Imports of Woven Fabrics of Cotton and Cot-
ton Mixtures Originating in Brazil, WT/DS190/2 (June 30, 2000), where a related
part of the complaint was decided by ad hoc arbitration in the Southern Common
Market ("MERCOSUR"). See also SHANY, supra note 31, at 59 ("The potential for
competition between the WTO and regional economic integration regimes was
also shown by a recent trade-related dispute between two members of
MERCOSUR, Brazil and Argentina, which was referred to the WTO while similar
proceedings were pending before the arbitration machinery of MERCOSUR
301 See Case C-112/00, Eugene Schmidberger Internationale Transporte Plan-
zuge v. Austria, 2003 E.C.R. 1-5659.
302 See Case C-377/98, Netherlands v. Eur. Parl. & Coun., 2001 E.C.R. 1-07079.
303 See Hertel v. Switzerland, 1998 Eur. Ct. H.R. 77.
304 See Case C-159/90, Soc'y for the Prot. of Unborn Children in Ir., Ltd. v.
Grogan, 1991-8 E.C.R. 1-4685, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 849 (1991) (the Court held that the
Irish advertising ban against a student organization distributing information on
foreign abortion services was not covered by EC law).
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in order to protect human rights,30 5 WTO panels lack legal exper-
tise in the field of human rights and have never clarified how WTO
obligations should be balanced and reconciled with the human
rights obligations of WTO members. WTO jurisprudence is, how-
ever, increasingly emphasizing the need for balancing international
trade, environmental, and other treaty obligations on the basis of
general legal principles such as non-discrimination, necessity, pro-
portionality, due process of law, and transparency. 3 6 However,
legal complaints in human rights bodies against legal decisions of
WTO bodies remain unlikely. Just as the European Commission
on Human Rights declined jurisdiction to review alleged human
rights violations in EC Court proceedings, 30 7 UN human rights
bodies are unlikely to assert jurisdiction over claims that WTO dis-
pute settlement bodies have disregarded UN human rights in-
struments.
Similar to the increasing number of human rights complaints
that have been lodged by the same individuals under more than
one regional or worldwide human rights instrument,308 the number
of judicial challenges in national, regional, and worldwide fora to
the same governmental trade restrictions (e.g., on bananas) is likely
to increase in the future. For instance, the refusal by several EC
member governments to approve genetically modified organisms
("GMOs") and to implement the 2002 EC Directive on the public
release of GMOs is currently being challenged at the WTO (e.g., by
Canada and the United States), in the ECJ (e.g., by the EU Commis-
sion), and in national courts (e.g., by the private applicants and
patent holders). Concurrent jurisdictions of, forum shopping
among, and parallel litigation in national, regional, and worldwide
fora create the risk of incompatible judgments and fragmentation
of law. This is especially the case if judges fail to construe national
and regional trade law in conformity with the WTO obligations of
305 See Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights and the Law of the World Trade
Organization, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 241 (2003) (outlining a human rights approach to
international trade).
306 See Jan Neumann & Elisabeth TUrk, Necessity Revisited: Proportionality in
World Trade Organization Law After Korea-Beef EC-Asbestos and EC-Sardines, 37 J.
WORLD TRADE 199 (2003) (discussing the comprehensive WTO jurisprudence and
treaty requirements for "nondiscrimination" and "necessity").
307 See Melchers v. Germany, Application No. 13258/87, 33 Y.B. EUR. CONY.
ON H.R. 46 (1990) (refusing to extend ratione materiae jurisdiction).
308 See SHANY, supra note 31, at 60 (referring to forty human rights complaints
that have been brought before both global and regional complaints procedures).
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Member States and other international agreements concluded
among WTO members outside the WTO (e.g., the rules on GMOs
in the Cartagena Protocol to the UN Convention on Biodiversity).
Prevention and settlement of disputes in international relations
may also fail if international courts rely exclusively on state-
centered rules without due regard to private rights of transnational
actors.
The few general international law rules limiting parallel or suc-
cessive disputes among the same parties leave open many ques-
tions. For instance, the lis alibi pendens rule prohibiting the com-
mencement of one judicial proceeding during the pendency of the
same dispute in a different judicial body does not apply to courts
of different national, regional, and worldwide legal systems unless
such a prohibition has been explicitly provided (e.g., in NAFTA
Article 2005:6). The same seems to be true of the res judicata re-
quirement that parties to a dispute must respect the final judgment
of a competent court; the ECJ, for example, has often ignored
GATT and WTO dispute settlement rulings on the illegality of EC
trade restrictions that were subsequently challenged before the EC
Court.30 9 The frequent parallelism among national, regional, and
WTO dispute settlement proceedings confirms that, in contrast to
the electa una via principle limiting multiple litigation by the same
parties, private complaints in domestic courts challenging a gov-
ernmental measure do not preclude a state party from challenging
the same measure in intergovernmental dispute settlement pro-
ceedings, even if the intergovernmental dispute has been initiated
at the request of the same private party that has challenged the
government measure in a pending domestic court proceeding as
well. Even though neither WTO, EC, nor NAFTA dispute settle-
ment bodies apply a stare decisis doctrine requiring the strict appli-
cation of judicial rulings from one case in similar future cases fea-
309 See Naboth van den Broek, Legal Persuasion, Political Realism, and Legiti-
macy: The European Court's Recent Treatment of the Effect of WTO Agreements in the
EC Legal Order, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 411 (2001) (discussing the EC's treatment of
WTO agreements); Geert Zonnekeyn, EC Liability for the Non-Implementation of
WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions: Advocate General Alber Proposes a 'Copernican In-
novation' in the Case Law of the ECJ, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 761 (2003) (focusing on some
of the more controversial issues dealt with in the Biret opinions). The judgment in
Case C-377/02, Van Parys v. Belgisch Interventie-en Restitutiebureau, 2005 O.J. (C
106) 4 confirms that the ECJ refuses to apply the WTO obligations of the EC even
if the legal inconsistency between an EC act and WTO law was formally estab-
lished in a legally binding ruling by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body and the
period for implementing the WTO ruling has expired.
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turing different parties, national and international courts should
cooperate more actively in protecting the rule of international law.
WTO dispute settlement bodies often apply stricter standards
of judicial review compared to the more deferential "margin of ap-
preciation" doctrine applied by human rights courts and the "po-
litical question" doctrines applied by domestic courts vis-az-vis for-
eign policy discretion.310 Competing jurisdictions among courts, as
well as academic criticism of introverted domestic judgments dis-
regarding the international obligations of the country concerned,
may contribute to improving the quality and overall consistency of
judicial reasoning. There is also a case to be made for using the co-
operation agreements among the WTO and other intergovernmen-
tal organizations for promoting coordination and cooperation
among their respective dispute settlement procedures. While the
coordination of competing jurisdictions among international courts
may be left to judicial practice, the need for interpreting and apply-
ing domestic and international trade rules in a more consistent
manner requires explicit, reciprocal recognition among trading
countries (as, e.g., in Article XX of the WTO Agreement on Gov-
ernment Procurement). Without such explicit recognition that na-
tional governments and domestic courts must interpret and apply
domestic and international trade law as a coherent legal system for
the benefit of citizens, conflicts between national, regional, and
worldwide trade rules and related jurisprudence will carry on to
the detriment of citizens and the rule of international law.
310 See MATrHIAS OESCH, STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(2003) (exploring the alternate standards of review in WTO dispute resolutions).
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